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Abstract 
Concussion, also known as mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI), represents a common 
injury in children, young adults, and athletes in particular. High rates of malingering have 
been demonstrated in individuals with MTBI when faced with monetary incentives, but 
research is yet to explore the impact of other incentives on test performance. The present 
study sought to examine the rate of effort test failure, symptom report, and 
neuropsychological test performance in college students assigned to one of three 
conditions: Fake Good, Fake Bad, and No Incentive conditions. All groups were asked to 
simulate concussion and provided a description of the injury and common symptoms. 
The Fake Good group was asked to pretend to be an athlete seeking to return to play 
following injury. The Fake Bad group was asked to pretend to be seeking academic 
accommodations after injury. The No Incentive group was provided no additional 
information. A sample of 171 participants was randomly assigned to one of three groups. 
Participants completed a symptom report, brief neuropsychological battery, and symptom 
validity test. The results suggested that the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups showed 
higher symptom report, weaker neuropsychological test performance, and higher rates of 
effort test failure than the Fake Good group. Regardless of group, effort test failure 
explained a significant amount of variance in neuropsychological test performance. The 
implications and limitations of the current findings are discussed, in addition to future 
directions for study. 
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The Impact of Incentives on Neuropsychological Test Performance: An 
Analog Study 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC; 2010) as a form of acquired injury that results from sudden trauma that 
produces damage to the brain. The American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine (Kay, 
1993) more explicitly defines concussion (or mild traumatic brain injury; MTBI) by the 
presence of traumatically induced physiological disruption of brain function that can be 
inferred by the presence of one or more of the following: any period of loss of 
consciousness, any memory loss immediately before or after the injury, any alteration of 
mental state (i.e., confusion or disorientation), and/or focal neurological deficits, which 
do not result in loss of consciousness greater than thirty minutes, an initial Glasgow 
Coma Scale score of  <13, or posttraumatic amnesia longer than 24 hours. Concussion 
typically follows a blow, or repeated blows, to the skull or action that causes quick 
acceleration and deceleration of the brain; this abrupt shift in movement can result in 
bruising of the brain on the bony protuberances of the skull, as well as pulling and 
stretching of neurons (Moser et al., 2007), also known as diffuse axonal injury. When 
neuronal fibers are stretched or damaged as a result of mild traumatic brain injury, the 
consequence is a neurometabolic cascade that disrupts cell metabolism, blood flow, and 
neurotransmission (Moser et al., 2007). TBI represents a group of injuries graded on a 
continuum of severity, ranging from mild to severe, with the most severe injuries 
carrying the potential for death or permanent disability. 
The CDC (Faul, Xu, Wald, & Coronado, 2010) estimates that 1.7 million 
Americans sustain a TBI each year, with approximately 1.3 million seeking emergency 
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medical treatment for such injuries. The CDC (Faul et al., 2010) also reports that TBI is 
most prevalent in children ages 0-4 years, adolescents ages 15-19, and adults over the age 
of 65. Falls and car accidents represent the two leading causes of TBI, with falls resulting 
in the greatest number of emergency room visits while motor vehicle accidents result in 
the highest death rate. Current estimates suggest that concussions represent about 70-90% 
of all treated traumatic brain injuries (Ponsford et al., 2001; Sterr, Herron, Hayward, & 
Montaldi, 2006) ranking concussion as the most common form of acquired brain damage 
(De Monte, Geffen, May, & McFarland, 2009). Motor vehicle accidents are the most 
common causes of concussion in adults (Ropper & Gorson, 2007), while motor vehicle 
accidents and sports participation are the most common causes in children and 
adolescents (Gessel, Fields, Collins, Dick, & Comstock, 2007). Approximately 300,000 
sports-related concussions occur annually in the United State alone, and account for 
nearly 9% of all injuries sustained in high school athletes and nearly 6% of the injuries 
sustained by college athletes (Gessel et al., 2007). Soldiers in battle represent another 
group at high risk for sustaining concussion. As demonstrated by the recent conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers are surviving bomb blasts at increased rates, and show 
similar increases in reports of concussion (Hoge et al., 2008; Snell & Halter, 2010). 
Despite our increased awareness of concussion as it relates to athletics and combat, some 
authors (i.e., Lewandowski & Reiger, 2009; Moser et al., 2007) suggest that current 
prevalence rate estimates of concussion may underestimate the actual rates due to 
underreporting and misdiagnosis. Thus, concussion has been termed the “silent epidemic” 
(Barth et al., 1989) as the injury may not result in overt symptoms and frequently goes 
undiagnosed. 
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Diagnosis of Concussion 
Concussion presents a unique diagnostic challenge as the immediate symptoms of 
injury, such as loss of consciousness or alteration of mental state, are often fleeting and 
diminish by the time the individual presents for treatment. After the initial symptoms 
remit, the most common complaints following concussion include headache, fatigue, 
blurred vision, poor concentration, sleep disruption, and mood changes (Sterr et al., 
2006). In addition, concussion is thought to impact a variety of cognitive and executive 
functions, such as processing speed, attention, working memory, and concentration 
(Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004). Although most people who sustain a concussion 
experience a remission of symptoms within 7–10 days of injury (Yeates & Taylor, 2005) 
some individuals may experience disruption of cognitive, emotional, and physical 
systems for more than three months post injury (Sigurdardottir, Andelic, Roe, Jerstad, & 
Schanke, 2009; Yeates et al., 1999).  
Postconcussion syndrome (PCS) is a term used to describe the long-term 
symptoms that can follow concussion and last from weeks to more than a year post-injury 
(Iverson & Lange, 2003). It is estimated that approximately 10% of individuals continue 
to report symptoms of concussion more than three months post-injury (Bigler, 2008). The 
most frequent PCS symptoms include memory disruption, headache, fatigue, irritability, 
anxiety, concentration difficulty, and dizziness (Binder, 1986). The literature is filled 
with controversy regarding the existence, course, causes, and predictors of PCS (Iverson 
& Lange, 2003). Post-concussion symptoms, like headache, fatigue, impatience, and poor 
concentration have been endorsed by high rates (40-75%) of non-injured control groups 
(Chan, 2001; Iverson & Lange, 2003) and by trauma patients with no concussion 
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(Landre, Poppe, Davis, Schmaus, & Hobbs, 2006), suggesting that the long-term 
symptoms of concussion are not specific to the injury. Research also suggests that the 
longer post-concussion symptoms last, the more likely emotional and psychological 
factors contribute to the condition (Landre et al., 2006). Further, as symptoms persist 
over time, some argue that psychological factors, such as depression, anxiety, or the 
desire to manage one’s impression, rather than injury-related factors, maintain the 
symptom complaints (Mulhern & McMillan, 2006). Overall, the symptoms of concussion 
are nonspecific, and may be related to a variety of non-injury factors; thus, diagnostic 
evaluation based on symptom report alone could lead to an inaccurate diagnosis.    
The diagnostic debate is also fueled by a poor understanding of the subtle 
physiological changes that result from concussion. Imaging techniques such as MRI and 
fMRI have helped to explain the relationship between brain damage and behavioral 
correlates in moderate to severe brain injury, but currently fail to provide information that 
is helpful in the diagnosis or management of concussion. More sensitive imaging 
techniques, such as high-resolution diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), have begun to 
identify white matter differences in concussed individuals when compared to healthy 
controls (Little et al., 2010). While these techniques are sensitive to the subtle changes in 
neural structures and pathways following concussion, they are not yet widely utilized in a 
clinical setting to diagnose concussion. Further, because there is a change in symptom 
presentation across time, clinicians are only beginning to explore and understand the 
biological timeline of concussion and the corresponding remission of symptoms. Also, 
there is fairly poor understanding of the individual differences that contribute to the 
experience of short- and long-term symptoms following injury. Unfortunately, the 
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diagnosis and treatment of concussion are imprecise tasks due to our relatively poor 
understanding of the neurochemical, structural, and individual characteristics that impede 
or expedite symptom resolution.   
Tools for Diagnosing and Monitoring Concussion 
Concussions often resolve quickly, may have an unpredictable course, and cause 
symptoms that are not specific to the injury. In practice, clinicians are forced to rely on 
symptom reports as the most frequent method of diagnosis and monitoring of the change 
in one’s condition across time. These questionnaires typically list the common symptoms 
of concussion and ask respondents to rate the severity of current symptoms they are 
experiencing on a Likert-type scale. Some symptom reports have respondents 
retroactively compare their current symptoms to their pre-injury status. An individual’s 
scores can then be monitored over time to determine whether symptoms are remitting or 
worsening. Among the most popular questionnaires are the Rivermead Post-Concussion 
Symptoms Questionnaire (RPQ; King, Crawford, Wenden, Moss, & Wade, 1995) and the 
Concussion Symptom Inventory (CSI; Randolph et al., 2009). Each of the measures is 
short, with fewer than 20 questions, and requires respondents to rate their experience of 
common physical, cognitive, and emotional symptoms of concussion on a Likert scale. 
The appeal of self-report questionnaires is their ease of use and scoring, their short time 
for completion, and their cost-effectiveness. In addition, these measures do not require 
administration by a highly trained professional. 
Although self-report checklists provide an easy method of collecting symptom 
information and are sensitive to concussion (Eyres, Carey, Gilworth, Neumann, & 
Tennant, 2005; Randolph et al., 2009), the common symptoms of concussion (i.e., 
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fatigue, headaches, poor concentration, and irritability) are not specific to concussion 
alone. For example, those presenting with psychological concerns such as anxiety, 
depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder often report similar complaints of headache, 
fatigue, and poor concentration (Gioia, Collins, & Isquith, 2008; Landre et al., 2006). In 
addition, symptom reports often require individuals to compare their current condition to 
pre-injury functioning, which may be subject to memory distortion and bias 
(Shuttleworth-Edwards, 2009). For example, retrospective reports may be affected by 
inaccurate memories, psychological factors, and other variables, such as the “good old 
days” phenomenon. This phenomenon suggests that when asked to recall behaviors or 
past performances, people tend to overestimate their skills, abilities, and wellbeing 
(Henry, Moffitt, Caspi, Langley, & Silva, 1994). Research suggests that individuals who 
sustain concussion may report fewer pre-injury symptoms, such as headaches, fatigue, 
and memory problems, than their non-injured peers (Ferguson, Mittenberg, Barone, & 
Schneider, 1999). Further, individuals with concussion may expect a significant increase 
in symptoms following injury, and underestimate the incidence of symptoms prior to 
injury (Gunstad & Suhr, 2001).  
Symptom reports alone do not provide a complete picture of concussion. Some 
individuals report symptoms yet show no brain or behavioral evidence of abnormality, 
whereas others report no symptoms yet demonstrate behavioral deficits upon examination 
(Slobounov et al., 2010). Symptom reports do not adequately measure compromised 
brain function such as slowed processing speed or memory deficits. Consequently, 
neuropsychological assessment has become a recommended method of monitoring the 
cognitive and behavioral disruption that can result from concussion (Mittenberg, 
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Theroux-Fichera, Zielinski, & Heilbronner, 1995). A typical neuropsychological 
evaluation will examine an individual’s performance across several domains of brain 
functioning, including: attention, memory and learning, visuoperception, verbal 
functions, academic skills, motor ability, executive functions, and emotional status 
(Lezak et al., 2004). A comprehensive list of commonly used neuropsychological 
measures is provided in Table 1. In addition to these tests an examiner may add 
supplemental measures to further explore an area of weakness, clarify diagnosis, or test a 
hypothesis regarding the nature of the deficit. These evaluations are time intensive, 
lasting from a few hours to more than eight hours per evaluation, and are often 
administered by a licensed psychologist with specialized training in assessment and 
neuropsychology (Zillmer, Spiers, & Culbertson, 2008).     
The wealth of information gathered from a comprehensive neuropsychological 
assessment can be valuable in diagnosis and treatment for a wide range of brain 
dysfunctions, including concussion. Both the initial and subsequent meetings of the 
International Conference of Concussion in Sport (Aubry et al., 2002; McCrory et al., 
2005) have concurred that the information gathered from neuropsychological assessment 
is integral in both diagnosing and managing concussion. The current guidelines suggest 
that neuropsychological testing should form the foundation of a post-concussion 
evaluation “and contributes significantly to both understanding of the injury and 
management of the individual” (Aubry et al., 2002, p. 8). In addition to these guidelines, 
the National Academy of Neuropsychology (NAN; Moser et al., 2007) specifically 
suggests a testing paradigm that includes both baseline and post-injury 
neuropsychological testing. While this model is typically not followed for every 
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concussion, the pre- and post-injury comprehensive testing scheme works well in athletic 
situations where there is a high incidence rate of concussion and need to prevent repeated 
concussions (i.e., football, soccer, and hockey). NAN also supports the use of targeted 
assessment to evaluate the functional domains most likely impacted by concussion 
including memory, processing speed, attention, and reaction time.  
Despite the recommendation that neuropsychological testing be utilized in both 
the diagnosis and management of concussion, the results of such testing tend to vary by 
individual and no single “concussion profile” currently exists. This makes it difficult to 
compare the scores of one concussed individual with that of others (Landre et al., 2006). 
In practice, the administration of a lengthy neuropsychological battery following a 
concussion may be inefficient and even unwarranted immediately after injury. Some 
authors (Randolph et al., 2009) suggest that neuropsychological testing should not be 
conducted until all symptoms of concussion have remitted or stabilized. Because 
concussions can resolve rather quickly, an early assessment would be akin to trying to 
pinpoint a moving target. A comprehensive neuropsychological battery may result in 
wasted time and effort, particularly if six hours of testing today would yield different 
results tomorrow. In addition, many commonly used neuropsychological measures were 
not designed for repeated use within a short time period, and thus would not be useful to 
monitor impairment following concussion. Also, traditional neuropsychological measures 
may lack the sensitivity and specificity to monitor the subtle cognitive effects of 
concussion (Schatz, Pardini, Lovell, Collins, & Podell, 2006), which further limits the 
benefits of this approach. Finally, a variety of salient individual factors, such as general 
intelligence, reading ability, years of education, and social class have been shown to be 
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associated with performance on neuropsychological measures (Greiffenstein & Baker, 
2003) and may further cloud the interpretation of test results. 
In light of the issues of using traditional neuropsychological measures in the 
monitoring of concussion juxtaposed against the time of administration, resources 
required, and psychometric issues, an alternative assessment paradigm has been 
developed for both baseline testing and repeated administration following injury. Several 
brief neuropsychological batteries have been developed for use in athletic settings to 
monitor the cognitive effects of concussion. Although these batteries should not be 
considered comprehensive, they utilize traditional neuropsychological assessments 
designed to measure the cognitive processes most often disrupted by concussion: 
processing and motor speed, memory, attention, and other executive functions such as 
mental flexibility (Gioia, Isquith, Schneider, & Vaughan, 2009; Maroon et al., 2000). 
Because sports concussions are common and potentially dangerous if repeated, 
identification and monitoring of concussions is imperative to prevent secondary injury 
(see Cantu, 1998 and Cantu & Gean, 2010, for a full discussion of second impact 
syndrome), while balancing the strong desire of players to return to participation (Collins 
et al., 1999; Grindel, Lovell, & Collins, 2001; Maroon et al., 2000).  
A major consideration in the use of brief batteries comprised of common 
measures to monitor the impact of concussion relates to the effect of practice. An 
assessment that is sensitive to the dynamic nature of concussions may also be sensitive to 
the effects of repeated administrations within a short time period, from the moment after 
injury across days of recovery. To combat the effect of practice, some batteries use 
alternate forms of measures or make adjustments in scoring based on multiple 
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administrations, each attempting to control practice effects across repeated assessments. 
Although brief neuropsychological batteries have some appeal in helping to identify and 
track the cognitive deficits that result from concussion immediately after injury and 
across recovery time, these batteries are not commonly used in hospital emergency 
departments, medical facilities, or athletic situations because they take time, require 
trained personnel, and may not reliably predict concussion status or long-term outcome 
(Naunheim, Matero, & Fucetola, 2008).  
Another trend in neuropsychological testing has been the development of 
computerized measures that can be administered in a variety of settings in a structured 
and timely manner following injury. Several batteries have been especially developed to 
allow for brief, repeated assessments across an array of tasks that are sensitive to the 
effects of concussion and insensitive to the effects of practice. These batteries can be 
useful for pre-injury evaluation, diagnosis, and the ongoing monitoring of the resolution 
of symptoms, thereby helping to determine when brain function has returned to normal. 
Computer-based monitoring of concussion has become the standard for many high school 
and college athletic programs (Gorny & Merten, 2005).  
Among the most popular of the commercially available computerized batteries is 
the Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT; Lovell, 
Collins, Podell, Powell, & Maroon, 2000). The ImPACT was developed for use in an 
athletic environment and for use as a pre- and post-injury measure for athletes who have 
sustained concussion. Thus, the ImPACT is used to both explore the specific cognitive 
processes disrupted by concussion but also monitor their remission over time and 
improve the reliability of return to play decisions.  
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The use of the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) has become increasingly popular 
among high school, college, and professional sports as it is quick to administer, is 
appropriate for repeated administration, and boasts practical appeal for practitioners 
working with athletes as it can be administered by laptop at the time of injury. Research 
by the test’s creators suggests the ImPACT is both a reliable and valid measure for the 
evaluation and monitoring of the cognitive effects of concussion. The ImPACT has been 
shown to demonstrate adequate reliability as Iverson, Lovell, and Collins (2003) found 
rates of test-retest reliability of the ImPACT composite scores to range from .67 (Visual 
Memory) to .86 (Processing Speed).  
Despite the strong reliability estimates reported by the ImPACT’s creators (Lovell 
et al., 2000) and collaborators (Collins et al., 1999; Iverson, Lovell, & Collins, 2003; 
Lovell et al. 2003), others have found the computerized testing programs to have less 
than desirable reliability and validity. For example, Broglio, Ferrara, Macciocchi, 
Baumgartner, and Elliot (2007) found the test-retest reliability of the ImPACT composite 
scores to be lower than optimal, ranging from .23 (Verbal Memory) to .39 (Reaction 
Time). Broglio and colleagues hypothesized these differences may be due to several 
factors. First, the Broglio team completed retesting at 45 and 50 days post injury, while 
others tended to use shorter intervals that more closely mirrored the return to play 
timeline for athletes. For example, Collins et al. (1999) completed testing at 3, 5, and 7 
days post injury while others (Iverson et al., 2003) completed preseason testing, then 
retesting within 72 hours of injury. Further, Broglio et al. calculated the intraclass 
correlation coefficients rather than the Pearson correlation statistic to explain test-retest 
reliability as Pearson’s r has been shown to overestimate correlation and is not sensitive 
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to learning or practice effects. Further, Broglio et al. relied on data from healthy 
individuals, while most of the research by the test’s creators has been conducted with 
concussed athletes (i.e., Collins et al., 1999; Iverson et al., 2003; Lovell, Collins, Iverson, 
Johnston, and Bradley, 2004).  
Although reliability is an important consideration, of perhaps more importance is 
the ability of a measure remission of symptoms and neurocognitive improvement as an 
individual heals from concussion. The ImPACT has been found to be a useful tool in 
monitoring the changes in processing speed within the week following injury (Erlanger et 
al., 2003). Others (Van Kampen, Lovell, Pardini, Collins, & Fu, 2006) have found that by 
comparing pre- and post-concussion ImPACT scores and symptom score totals, 93% of 
individuals who had sustained a concussion were correctly classified. Others (Schatz et 
al., 2006) have found that the ImPACT is sensitive (81.9%) and specific (89.4%) to the 
effects of concussion and accurately differentiates between individuals with concussion 
(82%) and healthy controls (89%). The ImPACT has also been shown to be sensitive to 
memory (Lovell et al., 2004) and processing speed (Iverson et al., 2003) decline 
following concussion. Collectively, these data support the use of the ImPACT in 
identifying the immediate cognitive symptoms of concussion as well as tracking 
remission over time. 
Effort Testing in Neuropsychological Assessment 
Regardless of the mode of testing, be it traditional paper-and-pencil or 
computerized, another threat to the validity of assessment data is the relationship between 
performance on the measure and the effort put forth by the examinee (Sweet et al., 2000). 
While it is intuitively clear that effort can impact psychological test scores, until recently 
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clinical judgment was considered sufficient in determining whether an individual 
completed testing with acceptable if not optimal effort (Hunt, Ferrara, Miller, & 
Macciocchi, 2007). As Bush and colleagues (Bush et al., 2005) explain, a number of 
factors including malingering, factitious disorders, clinical factors, or opposition to the 
assessment can all threaten the validity of assessment data. More specifically, some 
(Carone, Iverson, and Bush, 2010) have argued that anger, frustration, greed, personality 
characteristics, and misattribution of symptoms can influence an individual’s self-report 
of symptoms. Often, incentives exist that may influence whether an individual 
exaggerates symptoms. These incentives may include attempts to avoid responsibility, 
specific medical attention or medication, receipt of medical benefits, and monetary 
settlement. Much of the research in this area has surrounded individual’s intentional 
exaggeration of their symptoms (Nelson et al., 2003; Ruff, Wylie, & Tennant, 1993) in an 
attempt to identify and minimize the overprovision of medication, treatment, and 
monetary compensation (Raine, 2009). Conversely, some individuals may be motivated 
to minimize their symptoms (Ruff et al., 1993; Lovell et al., 2003; Bush et al., 2005), 
especially when doing so results in a return to desired activities such as work or athletic 
competition. More specifically, we can situations in which an athlete may under-report 
symptoms so that she or he can return to play a sport as soon as possible. 
 An underlying contributor to test performance is the individual’s level of 
motivation, which may be influenced by the presence of incentives. Motivation refers to 
an individual’s goal oriented behavior, which is contributed to by internal and external 
drives (Weiten, 2010). Intrinsic factors can include enjoyment of and interest in a task, 
and perception of gain from the task (Eccles, 2005). Others (Vallerand, 2004) suggest 
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three main intrinsic motivations: engagement for pleasure, engagement to learn, and 
engagement to promote accomplishment. Vallerand (2004) defined external motivations 
as rewards that are outside of the activity itself. In the area of concussion, some research 
(Orey, Cragar, & Berry, 2000) suggests that individuals can be motivated by external 
monetary reward to both minimize and maximize their self-report and 
neuropsychological test performance. Erdal (2009) found that individuals with external 
motivation (monetary compensation) showed significantly weaker performance on 
neuropsychological measures that those with internal motivations (attention seeking and 
avoidance of blame). Collectively, these findings suggest that an individual with 
concussion may have internal and external factors that influence their performance in 
testing situations.  
Despite the clinical interest in identifying individuals either minimizing or 
maximizing their symptom reports and test performance, it has proven difficult to 
estimate base rates of malingering, symptom exaggeration, and symptom repression in 
part because those attempting to do so either do not admit it or are not caught in the act 
(Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004). As 
defined by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) malingering is the 
intentional creation of symptoms or deficits to achieve a goal (i.e., “faking bad”). 
Malingering may include the creation of symptoms or deficits, the exaggeration of 
current symptoms or deficits, and even the staging of an accident or injury. A necessary 
component of malingering includes some gain from exaggerating impairment; these 
incentives can range from monetary payment to obtaining disability status to being 
prescribed a desired medication. A more subtle form of symptom exaggeration is 
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dissimulation, which can include over or under reporting of symptoms (i.e., “faking 
good”) and acting as though symptoms are better or worse than in reality (Sbordone, 
Saul, & Purisch, 2007).  
Survey results from several groups (i.e., Green, Rohling, Less-Haley, & Allen, 
2001; Mittenberg et al., 2002) suggest base rates of malingering in cases of concussion 
tend to hover around 30% in personal injury and disability litigation, whereas the rate 
drops significantly in medical cases not involving possible compensation. However, some 
research suggests that individuals may fail effort testing even in the absence of such 
incentives. For example, approximately 11% of a group of 200 uninjured high school 
athletes were found to complete neuropsychological assessment with suspect effort (Hunt 
et al., 2007). More recently, 17% of 193 children ages 8 through 17 years were found to 
have failed at least one objective measure of effort. Of the 33 children who failed effort 
testing, only one case was thought to be influenced by litigation or incentives (Kirkwood 
& Kirk, 2010). The high rates of malingering in the face of various incentives are of 
concern when working with an individual presenting with concussion who may be 
seeking such incentives, including monetary compensation, return to sports or work, or 
accommodations in school. Equally important to concussion is the exploration of 
dissimulation, which is currently absent from the literature in the area of concussion.  
Effort is a serious concern in evaluating the impact of concussion specifically, as 
well as performance on neuropsychological evaluations more generally. Psychologists 
may be interested in identifying poor effort or feigned performance in forensic, medical, 
and treatment settings and in cases in which an individual may receive benefits for 
malingered impairment. Given that people who intentionally fake bad are not likely to 
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self-disclose their malingering, it is important to identify those who may be faking. The 
National Academy of Neuropsychology recommends several methods of assessing 
symptom validity including evaluating consistency across measures, examining patterns 
of neurocognitive test performance, using validity scales from psychological tests, 
symptom validity tests, and forced-choice tests (Moser et al., 2005). Consistency can be 
evaluated by comparing information across a variety of sources, such as the patient’s self-
report of symptoms with a medical history, comparing symptom reports with 
observations of behavior, and evaluating whether response patterns are consistent with 
known patterns of cognitive functioning. Further, performance on neurocognitive 
measures can be considered against known patterns of invalid responding, inconsistency 
between observations and test performance, or comparing test results and background 
information or collateral reports.  
Psychological tests, symptom validity tests (SVTs), and forced-choice tests are 
perhaps the most well-known methods of exploring suspect effort or malingered 
performance across forensic, clinical, and medical settings. Some psychological 
measures, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher 
et al., 2001) and newly developed MMPI-2-Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF; Tellegan & 
Ben-Porath, 2008), have indices built into the measure to help determine whether the 
individual responds reliably and consistently throughout the assessment. Specifically, the 
MMPI-2 includes seven indices designed to identify feigned performance. These scales 
are meant to identify the over-report of rare symptoms, the endorsement of obvious 
symptoms of psychological disorders, the over-report of symptoms erroneously believed 
to represent psychological dysfunction, and feigned severity of symptoms. Score 
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elevations on one or more of these scales signals the clinician that the responses may not 
be valid and additional exploration into the respondent’s effort is warranted. The validity 
information on the MMPI-2 is extensive, and beyond the scope of the current review (see 
Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003). The MMPI-2 has been established as a reliable 
and valid method for evaluating malingering in general (Rogers et al., 2003) and in cases 
of concussion (Thomas & Youngjohn, 2009).   
Symptom validity tests (SVTs) and forced-choice tests are specifically designed 
to evaluate whether individuals are exaggerating their cognitive deficits on measures that 
are easily passed by those with severe brain injury and/or compromised cognitive 
aptitude. Symptom validity can be defined as the truthfulness of an examinee’s 
presentation, self-report of symptoms, or neuropsychological test performance (Bush et 
al., 2005). The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) is a commonly 
used SVT in the clinical setting. The TOMM includes two learning trials in which 50 
common objects are individually presented. At the end of each learning trial, individuals 
are presented with 50 recognition panels and the individual is asked to choose the item 
that appeared in the learning trials. After a delay, a Recognition Trial is completed, where 
the individual is again asked to choose the target item from the original presentations. 
The TOMM has been shown to demonstrate high sensitivity and specificity to poor effort, 
and accurately differentiate between those responding with full or poor effort (Rees, 
Tombaugh, Gansler, & Moczynski, 1998).  
Two commonly used examples of forced choice tests include the Word Memory 
Test (WMT; Green, 2003; Green, Allen, & Astner, 1995) and the shortened version, the 
Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004). Forced-choice tests are 
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commonly referred to as effort tests, and designed to identify an individual’s effort to 
perform well (Bush et al., 2005). Both the WMT and MSVT were designed to appear to 
measure verbal memory but instead provides an index of the validity of an individual’s 
performance. Individuals are presented pairs of words, and asked to recall those words 
immediately after presentation (Immediate Recall; IR) and following a delay (Delayed 
Recall; DR). A Consistency (CS) score is calculated on how well the person performed 
across IR and DR conditions. Effort is considered suspect if performance falls below the 
criterion of 82.5% (WMT) or 85% (MSVT) on the IR, DR, or CS trials. A more thorough 
discussion of the WMT and MSVT follows in the next section. 
From this brief review of the methods used for evaluating effort, it has become 
clear that effort is an important consideration when analyzing assessment data (for a 
complete review of malingering, effort, and psychological assessment see Iverson, 2007 
and Rogers, 2008). Regardless of the method employed, effort testing has become an 
accepted and desired adjunct to psychological assessment, particularly when various 
factors or incentives might influence examinee performance. Symptom validity tests and 
forced-choice tests of effort provide an appealing method of identifying malingering; 
performance that falls below chance or the cut-off is interpreted as evidence of deliberate 
feigning, given that performance below criterion suggests that the respondent knew the 
correct response and consciously chose the alternative (Orey et al., 2000). The use of 
these measures is strongly recommended in assessments that bear on decisions to return 
to work, play a sport, award compensation, decide competence, seek test 
accommodations, and provision of treatment (e.g., by obtaining a diagnosis of ADHD, an 
individual can gain access to stimulant medication). As the use of effort testing expands 
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into clinical practice, it appears it is only a matter of time until effort testing is a standard 
component across all clinical evaluations, whether the patient is referred for a medical, 
psychiatric, neurologic, or educational evaluation.  
Effort Testing and Concussion 
Perhaps the most intriguing research in the area of concussion, effort, and 
malingering has stemmed from the work of Green and colleagues (Green, 2007; Green, 
Flaro, & Courtney, 2009; Green, Iverson, & Allen, 1999; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, & 
Allen, 2001). Early work by these collaborators focused mostly on the comparison in 
effort test failure by individuals with mild traumatic brain injury compared to individuals 
with more serious brain injury (Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 2001). For example, the 
authors (Green et al., 1999) administered several forced choice symptom validity 
measures, including the Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, 2003; Green, Allen, & 
Astner, 1995) to individuals with mild traumatic brain injury and moderate-to-severe 
brain injury. Individuals in the mild head injury group showed significantly weaker 
performance than the other groups across each of the scales of the WMT. Further, group 
differences could not be explained by IQ or years of education as the groups were similar 
across both. The authors noted the paradox between a minor injury and weaker effort test 
scores and concluded it was unlikely the poor performance was caused by a minor injury. 
Rather, they hypothesized that these participants purposely minimized their performance. 
 In another study Green et al., (2001) utilized a sample of 904 patients referred for 
a neuropsychological assessment, 470 of which were head injury referrals. Each 
individual was administered a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment that 
included measures of executive functioning, memory and learning, verbal 
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comprehension, attention and working memory, perceptual organization, psychomotor 
skills, and symptom validity including the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995). Test 
results were converted into z-scores and a single index z-score was created for each 
person to create an Overall Test Battery Mean (OTBM). Similarly, the authors created an 
overall symptom validity (SV) z-score using symptom validity test data.  
 Using the entire sample of 904 participants, effort explained between 40–54 % of 
the variance in the participants overall performance across neuropsychological measures. 
The authors also explored the rates of effort test failure by referral source and diagnosis. 
Patients referred by the Worker’s Compensation Board showed the highest rate of failure 
at 35%, while 25% of individuals involved in personal injury litigation and 23% involved 
in disability insurance claims failed effort testing. Individuals presenting with mild head 
injury (with less than 24 hours of post-traumatic amnesia) showed a failure rate of 34% 
while individuals with post-traumatic amnesia lasting more than one day showed an 18% 
failure rate. Individuals presenting with neurological disorders showed a similarly low 
rate of failure at 16%. These rates showed that individuals with monetary incentive to 
appear impaired showed higher rates of effort test failure.  
 In exploring the differences between only those participants with head injury, the 
authors separated the participants into groups based on the severity of injury. Overall, the 
OTBM score difference between those with genuine mild head injuries and genuine 
severe head injuries was .27 SD. Interestingly, the difference between those who failed 
effort testing scored 1.21 standard deviations below those who passed effort testing. In 
addition, individuals with mild head injury who passed the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et 
al., 1995) scored .12 standard deviations below the normal mean, while those presenting 
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with mild head injury who failed effort testing scored 1.24 standard deviations below the 
normal mean. Finally, the authors found effort explained 53% of the variance in 
neuropsychological test score performance, while education only explained 11% and age 
only 4%. In addition, effort explained far more variance in neuropsychological test scores 
than presence or severity of brain injury. In sum, individuals with mild head injuries who 
failed effort testing tended to perform worse than their peers who passed effort testing 
and individuals with more severe head injuries. Also, individuals who were faced with 
monetary incentive and had mild injuries showed higher rates of effort test failure than 
those with more significant head injury in the absence of monetary incentive. Together, 
these results suggest that effort impacts neuropsychological test performance more than 
head injury severity, age, and education.   
 In a 2007 follow-up study, Green utilized the same participant data with the 
addition of 403 consecutive cases that presented for neuropsychological evaluation. As 
with the previous study, referral sources often included Worker’s Compensation, private 
insurance companies, and lawyer recommendation. The methods and measures used 
mirror those from the 2001 study.   
Of the total sample (n = 1,307), 31% failed effort testing by scoring below 82.5% 
on any one of three WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) scales. Scores of those who 
failed effort testing were then compared with scores of 25 individuals with diagnosed 
dementia. Those who failed effort testing showed weaker performance that those with 
dementia across the early measure of the WMT (i.e., Immediate Recall and Delayed 
Recall). Further, those who failed effort testing showed higher performance on the more 
difficult subtests of the WMT; this pattern of responding suggests those who failed effort 
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testing possess the cognitive skills to successfully complete the measure. The results from 
neuropsychological testing were also similar when comparing the performance of those 
who failed effort testing to those who passed; there was a significant difference between 
those who passed and failed effort testing on measures of verbal memory, visual memory, 
motor speed, working memory, performance IQ, and verbal IQ. Further, individuals that 
passed effort testing but performed in the less than optimal range showed a predictable 
reduction in test performance when compared to those who scored in the optimal effort 
range. As with the previous studies, Green concluded that the effort with which an 
individual completes testing explains more variance in test scores than brain injury or 
other factors like education or age.   
 The most recent work of Green and colleagues (Green et al., 2009) explored rates 
of effort test failure on both the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) and the 
shortened version, the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004). The 
authors utilized retrospective analysis of 163 individuals with moderate-to-severe 
traumatic brain injury (MSTBI) and 309 individuals with concussion. A small 
comparison group of healthy school-age children (ages 7–11) was recruited from 
Canadian schools (n = 55). An additional comparison group was created retrospectively 
from children referred for clinical assessment for a variety of diagnoses including fetal 
alcohol syndrome, conduct disorder, and ADHD (n = 422). From this group of children, a 
subgroup with developmental disorders and memory impairment was created (n = 25). 
Two groups of adult participants were created. One group was asked to take the test with 
full effort (n = 148) while the second was asked to simulate memory impairment in a way 
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to avoid detection (n = 89). Two parallel groups of children were created (n = 81 and n = 
27, respectively).  
 The authors presented the rates of effort test failure by group. All but 2 of 55 
healthy children successfully passed the MSVT (Green, 2004) by scoring at or above 
85% across the IR, DR, and CS subscales. The healthy adult participants instructed to 
provide optimal effort showed similar performance with all but 7 of the 148 passing the 
MSVT. All of the children and nearly all (87 of 89) of the adult simulators were able to 
successfully feign memory deficits and fail the MSVT. From these data, the authors 
found that the MSVT was able to accurately classify individuals who gave poor effect, as 
they calculated an average sensitivity of 98.3% to poor effort. Further, the test was 
determined to show a high specificity to poor effort (96%). Together, these data suggest 
that the MSVT is useful in identifying individuals who approach testing with low effort 
and is unlikely to give false positive results. 
 The authors compared the rates of failure of two clinical groups on the WMT 
(Green, 2003; Green, et al, 1995) and the MSVT (Green, 2004): adults with mild TBI and 
adults with moderate-to-severe MTBI (MSTBI). On the both the WMT and MSVT, the 
mild TBI group showed a significantly higher rate of failure (48%) than the moderate-to-
severe TBI group (48% to 22.7%, and 42% to 16%, respectively). Both groups showed a 
significantly higher rate of effort test failure on both the MSVT and WMT than children 
evaluated clinically. These findings suggest that failure on the easy MSVT subtests was 9 
times more frequent in MTBI cases than in children with developmental disabilities.  
The compendium of work by Green and colleagues (Green, 2007; Green et al., 
2009; Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 2001) has demonstrated that even children with 
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developmental disabilities or memory impairment can pass effort tests such as the WMT 
(Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) and MSVT (Green, 2004) reliably, whereas adults 
presenting with mild head injury and external incentives to malinger show significantly 
higher rates of failure. In addition, adults with mild head injuries showed much higher 
rates of effort test failure than their more seriously injured adult peers. Similarly, others 
(Bianchini, Curtis, & Greve, 2006) found individuals with mild TBI were more likely 
than their more severely injured peers to have positive hits on measures of malingering. 
In addition, Green and colleagues (Green, 2007, Green et al., 2009) demonstrated that 
individuals who fail effort testing also show a predictable and significant decline in 
neuropsychological test performance. As stated clearly by Green, if we accept that MSVT 
and WMT test failure in adults is the result of concussion, we must also accept that a mild 
injury can cause memory impairment so severe that when compared to children with 
documented memory or cognitive impairment, adults with concussion should be expected 
to perform more than two standard deviations lower on standardized neuropsychological 
measures. Instead, it seems a more likely conclusion is that adults with concussion 
showed higher rates of failure across the MSVT and WMT because they approached 
testing with less than optimal effort in an attempt to maximize impairment to obtain 
monetary compensation. In support of this conclusion, the work of Green and colleagues 
has consistently shown that adults with concussion showed a higher failure rate than 
healthy and impaired children, child and adult simulators, and adults with documented 
dementia. Further, effort consistently explained more than 50% of the variance in 
neuropsychological test scores, far more than intellectual ability, age, or education. In 
addition, it appears that a significant portion of individuals with concussion do not 
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complete neuropsychological measures with their full effort, even simple tasks that can 
be passed by children with developmental disabilities and documented memory 
impairment. 
Symptom Over and Under Reporting   
Individuals with concussion may be motivated to modify their symptom reports 
for a variety of reasons. As demonstrated by the work of Green and colleagues, some 
individuals with concussion may be motivated by monetary incentives, such as Worker’s 
Compensation, to over-report the symptoms of concussion. As effort testing has become 
increasingly integrated into clinical practice, research has identified the relationship 
between monetary incentives and the experience of prolonged post-concussion symptoms 
(Bianchini et al., 2006). As discussed previously, the current estimates suggest that in 
cases of financial compensation, approximately 30% of individuals are thought to involve 
exaggeration of symptoms or impairment (Green et al., 2001; Mittenberg et al., 2002). In 
sum, research suggests that individuals with concussion and monetary incentives are both 
more prone to effort test failure and more apt to over-report the symptoms of concussion 
than those without monetary incentive. 
Alternative motivations to monetary incentives may exist for some individuals 
with concussion who exaggerate their symptoms or impairment. For example, some may 
be motivated to appear more impaired in an attempt to obtain academic accommodations. 
Specifically, students that have suffered a concussion may require a variety of academic 
supports to stay current with their work. These types of accommodations can include 
reduction of homework, modified testing procedures (such as extended time or the 
allowance of breaks), and/or increased flexibility in assignment requirements (Kirkwood, 
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Yeates, & Wilson, 2006). These accommodations can be informal or provided through 
either a Section 504 plan or an Individualized Education Plan (IEP; Kirkwood et al., 
2006). Typically, a student seeking formal accommodations at the post-secondary level 
would be required to provide documentation of injury and deficit to their college Office 
of Disability Services, which in turn would decide the appropriateness of educational 
accommodations. Students with a recent history of concussion may perceive these 
accommodations as incentives for a variety of reasons. Some students may believe that 
that their academic ability has been diminished by the concussion and perceive that the 
accommodations will help them perform to their academic capacity. In contrast, some 
individuals who have been provided accommodations following concussion may have 
found the accommodations to be helpful and seek to retain them even after the symptoms 
of concussion remit. Additionally, some individuals without significant cognitive 
disruption following concussion may be motivated to obtain desired accommodations by 
manipulating symptom reports and minimizing test performance.  
Student’s willingness to malinger symptoms of concussion to obtain academic 
accommodations may not be surprising if we consider students from the general 
population report they would prefer to have access to such testing accommodations 
(Lang, Elliot, Bolt, & Kratochwill, 2008; Lewandowski, Lovett, Panahon, Lambert, & 
Systma, 2012). As summarized by Frazier and colleagues (Frazier, Frazier, Busch, 
Kerwood, & Demaree, 2008), students may be willing to simulate a learning disability 
(LD) when faced with the potential of school failure, removal of previously obtained 
accommodations, or exposed to increasingly demanding educational workload and 
requirements. As high stakes tests, such as the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and 
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Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) have become inextricably linked to pre- and post-
secondary academic success, students may be more likely to seek alternative methods of 
increasing their performance (Banerjee & Shaw, 2007; Pitoniak & Royer, 2001). 
Although accommodations are designed to help even the playing field for individuals 
with disability and should theoretically not boost non-disabled individuals’ performance 
(Pitoniak & Royer, 2001), they may be appealing for some non-disabled students to 
pursue. Recent exploration into the rate of effort test failure in college students presenting 
for screening evaluations to rule out a learning disability suggests failure rates of 
approximately 20% (Osmon & Mano, 2008), with a similar estimate for students 
presenting for ADHD screening (Harrison, 2006). This suggests that a substantial subset 
of individuals who present for an ADHD or LD evaluation may falsify or exaggerate their 
impairment. 
In contrast to the individual who over-reports symptoms to obtain academic 
accommodations, athletes with a history of concussion who are motivated to return to 
play may be more likely to minimize their symptom reports (fake good) and perform 
optimally on neuropsychological measures. Interestingly, some literature (Brooks, 2007) 
suggests that adolescent athletes may be more likely to underreport their concussion 
symptoms presumably to avoid being removed from play. The motivation for concealing 
impairment can also involve the potential loss of one’s position or scholarship, letting 
down teammates, coaches, and fans, missing out on professional opportunities, and being 
considered a failure by fans and teammates (Barth et al., 1989). Despite the recent media 
attention to the importance of preventing an early return to sports participation following 
head injury, particularly in contact sports like football and hockey, there are no estimates 
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of the percentage of athletes returning to play before the symptoms of concussion fully 
remit.   
The return to sports participation following concussion makes for an important 
and sometimes controversial decision. Often, the decision is based largely on the 
behaviors and symptoms reports of the athletes who may be motivated to return to play as 
quickly as possible. If symptoms are not fully resolved, athletes may be at risk for 
another concussion and more severe consequences (Sarmiento, Mitchko, Klein, & Wong, 
2010). Although several sets of guidelines for return-to-play decisions exist, they all 
concur that athletes must avoid contact sports until cerebral symptoms have subsided 
(Swaine & Friedman, 2001). Further, the severity of the concussion and length of loss of 
consciousness must be considered; those athletes with no or very brief loss of 
consciousness should be removed from sports for a week while those with loss of 
consciousness of longer duration should be removed for two weeks (Swaine & Friedman, 
2001). In addition, both meetings of the International Conference of Concussion in Sport 
(2001 and 2004; Aubry et al., 2002; McCrory et al., 2005) recommended that athletes 
should not return to play until neuroimaging results are unremarkable and they are free of 
signs or symptoms of concussion both at rest and after exertion. However, research has 
found that athletes who reported they were symptom free still showed cognitive 
impairment on a brief neuropsychological measure (Broglio, Macciocchi, & Ferrara, 
2007). Similarly, others (Fazio, Lovell, Pardini, & Collins, 2007) found that concussed 
student athletes who claimed to be asymptomatic performed worse than normal controls 
and better than a group of symptomatic concussed athletes. These studies suggest that the 
effects of concussion can linger, that those with concussion may not be able to accurately 
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report when the cognitive effects or symptoms have resolved totally, that symptom report 
is an insufficient method of monitoring the cognitive effects of injury, and that athletes in 
particular may under report any problems in an effort to return to sports play.  
Analog Research on Effort  
The assessment of individuals with concussion requires information from multiple 
methods and sources rather than self-report alone. Ideally, symptom report would be 
augmented by neuropsychological test results and effort testing. All need to be 
interpreted within the context of the possible motivations for maximizing or minimizing 
symptom reports and performance.  In the concussion literature, the research on 
performance in the context of incentives has focused almost exclusively on financial 
incentives. Fortunately, research with other clinical disorders has examined other 
contingencies that might affect one’s self report and performance on an assessment. 
An area of research and clinical practice that has encountered similar 
methodological and diagnostic issues as concussion is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD). The diagnosis of ADHD is primarily based on observation or report of 
specific symptoms. Clinicians that assess individuals presenting with ADHD must often 
rely on self-reports of non-specific symptoms for diagnosis (Harrison, Edwards, & 
Parker, 2007). As with symptom scales for concussion, ADHD symptom checklists are 
plagued by the non-specificity of some ADHD symptoms and prone to over identification 
of individuals as positive for ADHD (Harrison, 2006). Unfortunately, self-report 
questionnaires are also relatively easy to falsify in both concussion and ADHD. 
Using a sample of healthy undergraduate students (n = 80), Jachimowicz and 
Geiselman (2004) provided participants with the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychological 
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Association, 2000) diagnostic criteria for ADHD. After studying the diagnostic criteria 
for five minutes, the participants were asked to complete one of four diagnostic measures, 
and respond as if they struggled with ADHD. The results indicated that 65-95% of 
participants were able to successfully respond in a manner indicative of ADHD, 
depending on the self-report measure used. Similarly, Harrison et al., (2007) found 
ADHD takes little coaching to successfully fake. The authors assigned healthy university 
students (n = 70) to one of two groups: Honest Normals or Faking. Participants in the 
Honest Normals group were instructed to simply complete the measures with their best 
effort. Participants in the Faking group were provided with the DMS-IV-TR diagnostic 
criteria for ADHD and were instructed to perform in a manner indicative of ADHD. 
Participants from both groups completed the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale 
(Conners, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1998) and the Woodcock Johnson Psychoeducational 
Battery – Third Edition (WJ-III; McGrew & Woodcock, 2001). The results indicated that 
participants in the Faking group were able to successfully modify their performance on 
both the symptom report and cognitive measure. Also, when compared to a group of 
students with verified ADHD diagnoses (n = 72) the Faking group showed weaker 
performance across the cognitive measure. Collectively, research suggests that ADHD, 
like concussion, is easy to fake.  
Another similarity between ADHD and concussion is that there appear to be 
incentives for some people to obtain a diagnosis. In cases of ADHD, these incentives may 
include access to medication such as Ritalin that can be used or sold, and access to 
special academic accommodations that may make school and standardized exams less 
strenuous. There has been increasing concern that college students, for example, have 
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caught on to how easy it is to obtain the diagnosis of ADHD and receive the 
accompanying benefits. In fact, the number of diagnoses of ADHD in college age 
students is increasing at an alarming rate (Harrison, 2006). Together, these circumstances 
suggest that assessment of ADHD should include the evaluation of effort or symptom 
validity. 
As with concussion, those working with an ADHD population are forced to rely 
on symptom reports of nonspecific symptoms that are completed by individuals who may 
be motivated for a variety of reasons to appear impaired. As with concussion, 
neuropsychological evaluations of ADHD typically incorporate symptom reports, self-
report questionnaires, and measures of neurocognitive function and general academic 
achievement (Sullivan, May, & Gallaby, 2007). As in concussion, these test results can 
then be used to determine whether an individual requires formal academic support 
through a Section 504 or Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As with concussion, there 
appears to be a growing trend in the literature to explore how individuals with ADHD 
may modify their performance on these types of evaluations. 
The research in the area of ADHD can also help to inform the process of 
identifying individuals with a history of concussion who manipulate symptom reports and 
neuropsychological test performance in an attempt to obtain academic accommodations. 
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of adults and post-
secondary students requesting an evaluation to explore the possibility of an ADHD 
diagnosis (Harrison et al., 2007). As such, it has become increasingly salient to separate 
those individuals with legitimate difficulties and those seeking secondary gain. Harrison 
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(2006) estimated that approximately 20% of students seeking ADHD disability status at 
the university level willfully fake their symptoms of ADHD.      
A recent study by Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan, et al., 2007) suggests the 
estimates by Harrison (2006) may underestimate the rate of faking bad in university 
students presenting for an ADHD evaluation. Using a university sample of students 
presenting for an evaluation of ADHD, LD, or ADHD/LD combined, the authors found 
significantly higher rate of WMT failure (47.6%) in individuals presenting with ADHD 
than LD (15.4%) and ADHD/LD combined (9.4%). Overall, as participants’ presenting 
with ADHD reported higher numbers of symptoms of ADHD, they also demonstrated 
weaker performance across the WMT; this pattern of responding suggests that students 
who presented for ADHD evaluations may have minimized test performance while 
maximizing symptom report. 
A similar study (Frazier et al., 2008) utilized healthy college students who were 
randomly assigned to a control group, simulated ADHD, or simulated reading disability 
(RD). Both simulated clinical groups were asked to pretend as though there were 
experiencing difficulties in school, provided information on the benefits of academic 
accommodations, and a brief description of disorder-specific symptoms. Participants in 
both simulation groups were asked to fake in a convincing manner so as to avoid 
detection. In the control condition, participants were asked to provide their best effort 
throughout the evaluation. Several measures of effort were utilized, including the 
Validity Indicator Profile (VIP; Frederick, 2003), Rey Fifteen Item Test (Rey FIT; Rey, 
1964) and Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Thompson, 
1997). As expected, the simulated ADHD and RD groups showed significantly weaker 
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performance across all measures of symptom validity than the control group. 
Interestingly, the authors also found that the RD group showed weaker performance than 
the ADHD on verbal components of the VIP and VSVT, suggesting that they attenuated 
their feigned performance to reading-specific tasks. 
Based on these data, it appears those working with a university sample should 
anticipate that a significant portion of students presenting for ADHD and LD evaluations 
may not approach testing with their full effort. The estimates from 24.5% to 47.6 % of 
poor effort in combined ADHD/LD and ADHD evaluations are similar to the estimates 
found by others (i.e., Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher, & McCaffrey, 2005). 
Further, the results suggest that relying on self-report of symptoms alone appears 
inappropriate, considering the ease with which symptom reports can by modified and the 
relative insensitivity of self-report questionnaires to faking.  
Interestingly, significantly less research has focused on the exploration of the 
rates of effort test failure in students presenting with learning disabilities. One group 
(Lindstrom, Lindstrom, Coleman, Nelson, & Gregg, 2009) compared performance on 
several measures of effort across three groups: healthy controls, simulated learning 
disabled, and legitimate learning disabled. The authors noted that a significant portion of 
the individuals in the legitimate LD group had “motive to feign” although no further 
explanation was provided. The results showed high rates of effort test failure in the 
simulated LD group, ranging from 32% to 41% across WMT trials, and significantly 
lower rates of failure in the legitimate LD (3–5%) and healthy control (<1%) groups.  
As demonstrated by this review of the literature in the areas of concussion and 
ADHD, analog studies represent a common method of exploring malingering (Demakis 
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2004; Rogers & Cruise, 1998). As Rogers and Cruise explain, participants are randomly 
assigned to malingering conditions and the results compared to parallel clinical samples. 
The same authors found that participants were able to successfully modify their responses 
on symptom reports to match the value of the incentive offered. Similarly, previous 
analog research by Demakis (1999) demonstrated that undergraduates were able to 
consistently perform similarly to actual malingerers on several neuropsychological 
measures. Several authors have found the simulators’ scores on neuropsychological 
measures are often similar to those of real-world comparison groups, such as individuals 
with TBI (Sweet et al., 2000; Mittenberg et al., 1995).  
Analog research represents an appealing method of studying malingering for a 
variety of disorders. However, the use of analog design presents several limitations. Most 
notably is the concern about the generalizability, or external validity, of the results 
(Rogers & Cruise, 1998). As stated by Rogers and Cavanaugh (as cited by Rogers & 
Cruise, 1998) analog research requires individuals to comply when asked to fake, while 
in reality, malingerers fake when asked to comply. In relying on analog design to study 
the complex relationship between malingered performance and test performance, the 
potential exists to errantly assume the generalizability from an analog group to a clinical 
group without regard for the contributions of the injury or disorder to performance. In 
addition, the setting of analog research may result in decreased ecological validity. 
Analog studies are often conducted in groups, in a lab setting, without actual 
ramifications or incentives for responding in the instructed manner. In actuality, 
individuals who malinger face a variety of incentives or consequences for their 
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performance, and complete their evaluation individually with a psychologist or 
neuropsychologist.  
Despite the limitations inherent to their use, analog designs provide a method to 
explore the phenomena that may not be feasibly studied with a large-scale clinical study. 
More specifically, it is difficult to study patterns malingered or low-effort performance as 
those who malinger may be unwilling to admit it. By conducting analog studies, 
researchers are able to identify potential correlates of malingered performance in a group 
provided explicit instruction to malinger. These results provide insight into the methods 
and patterns by which performance is simulated, thereby allowing more comprehensive 
analysis of test data in practice. Lastly, simulation studies allow researchers to explore 
the impact of explicit coaching on successful malingering, an unethical and problematic 
practice when using a clinical group. Despite the limitations to generalizability, 
simulation studies provide unique insight into the relationships between feigned 
performance, incentives, and pre-assessment variables such as coaching, which would be 
otherwise difficult to obtain using a clinical sample. 
Current Study 
Head injuries are very common, especially mild ones labeled as concussions. 
Concussions are dynamic in nature, and it appears that in most cases the brain injury 
resolves quickly and completely. However, for some, effects of concussion may persist. 
Typically, clinicians evaluate the effects of concussion through use of self-report 
measures, which can be inaccurate, biased, and measure symptoms that are not specific to 
concussion. The reliance on self-report measures is particularly problematic when 
practical or psychological reasons exist for maintaining or denying symptoms. The use on 
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self-report of the non-specific symptoms of concussion is aided by both traditional and 
computerized neuropsychological testing, but the impact of effort on these measures is 
unclear. In addition, both computerized and traditional neuropsychological testing are 
prone to problems of performance validity as studies have found high rates of 
malingering (validity failure) among those with brain injury and other clinical groups 
(i.e., ADHD)  that encounter incentives. The need for additional study of the relationship 
between non-monetary incentives, concussion, and symptom report is clear as no study as 
yet has investigated both symptom exaggeration (fake bad) and symptom repression (fake 
good) of concussion in the same study.  
The current study sought to examine two realistic incentive scenarios that could 
influence the test performance of students with concussion. All participants were 
provided identical instructions on concussion: they were asked to pretend as though they 
sustained a concussion and provided with the common symptoms of the injury. The 
manipulation occurred when one group was provided instruction to pretend to be college 
athletes faced with the return to sports participation (Fake Good), and another group 
asked to pretend to be college students preparing for a high stakes exams faced with the 
attainment of academic accommodations (Fake Bad). The third group was provided no 
additional information (No Incentive). All participants were asked to keep all information 
in mind while completing the questionnaires and psychological measures.  
The current study was designed to answer several questions that arise from the 
current trends in research and gaps in our understanding of the relationships between 
external motivation, concussion, and neuropsychological testing. First, the study was 
designed to replicate the results found by others (Harrison et al., 2007; Jachimowicz & 
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Geiselman, 2004) that suggest individuals who are provided scripts and a description of a 
disorder (i.e., concussion) can respond similarly to individuals with that disorder. At the 
most basic level, it was expected that participants would be able to modify their response 
patterns in a manner that is similar to individuals with an actual concussion.  
Assuming that participants would be able to successfully simulate a concussion, 
group comparisons by incentive condition were planned across several domains: 
frequency of effort test failure, symptom report, and neuropsychological test 
performance. Collectively, it was hypothesized that the groups would show a consistent 
pattern of performance across these domains. Specifically, it was expected that the Fake 
Bad group would show significantly weaker performance than the Fake Good and No 
Incentive groups across domains. The Fake Bad group was expected to group to show the 
highest rate of effort test failure, the highest symptom report, and the weakest 
neuropsychological test performance. Given that it anticipated there would be an 
adequate number of participants who failed effort testing, it was planned to compare the 
neuropsychological test performance of individuals who passed and failed effort testing, 
regardless of group. 
Method 
Participants 
The current study utilized a college-age sample recruited through the Department 
of Psychology research pool at Syracuse University. Potential participants were recruited 
via SONA, the online system by which individuals in the subject pool are able view and 
enroll for participation in studies. Additionally, participants were recruited via mass 
email and campus flyers that provided details of the study and contact information for the 
  
 
38 
 
investigator. A total sample of 198 students was recruited. G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) estimates for each of the planned statistical procedures 
suggested the current sample size was adequate. Specifically, for the comparison of effort 
test failure between three groups, a medium effect size (ɸc) of .25, alpha of .05, and a 
power value of .80 with three groups, the total number of participants required for 
sufficient results using chi-squared test was n = 155.  For a one-way analysis of variance 
on mean symptom report and correct SDMT items, respectively, using an effect size of 
.25 (f), alpha of  .05, and a power value of .80 with three groups, the total number of 
participants required was n = 159. Using the same alpha and power values, the sample 
size needed for analysis of neuropsychological variables (including the 4 composite 
scores of the ImPACT), with the assumption of a small effect size of .10 (f), three groups, 
and four response variables, was estimated to be n = 81.  
From the total sample, data from three individuals was removed due to 
withdrawal from the study, while data from two participants was removed for failure to 
complete the demographic information. Of the remaining sample (n = 193), a small 
portion had failed to indicate either their status as a college athlete (n = 4) or disability 
status (n = 3). Given that no one participant was missing more than one item from the 
demographic questionnaire, data from these participants was retained. Finally, students 
who self-reported a learning disability (n = 8), attention disorder (n = 8), or multiple 
disabilities including either a learning disability or attention disorder (n = 6) were 
removed, leaving a final sample of 171 students.  
Demographic information for each of the groups is summarized in Table 2. In 
sum, 171 participants were included in this study, ranging in age from 18–24 years (M = 
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19.41 years, SD = 1.47 years). The majority of the sample was female (65.5%), college 
freshmen (52.6%), non-athletes (71.9%), non-disabled (96.5%), and had no history of 
concussion (83.0%). Chi-square tests were used to explore whether the groups exhibited 
significant differences across the demographic categories of sex, year in school, disability 
status, athletic status, or concussion history. Given that multiple comparisons were run, a 
Bonferroni correction was implemented and resulted in an alpha of .01. There were no 
significant differences between the groups on sex χ² (2, n = 171) = 5.49, p = .06, year in 
school χ² (2, n = 171) = 3.93, p = .69, disability status χ² (2, n = 168) = 1.71, p = .43, 
athletic status χ² (2, n = 167) = 1.24, p = .87, or concussion history χ² (2, n = 171) = 
10.76, p = .10. The results of a one-way analysis of variance showed there were no 
significant age differences by group, F(2, 168) = .05, p = .95. 
Measures 
 Manipulation Check. 
Memory Complaints Inventory. 
The Memory Complaints Inventory (MCI; Green, 2003) was used in the current 
study as a manipulation check to evaluate whether participants manipulated their 
performance as instructed. Group means from the General Memory Problems (GMP) 
subscale score were compared to the mean GMP score of healthy adults provided by the 
test creator. The percentage of participants in each group who had higher GMP scores 
than healthy volunteers was also calculated.  
The MCI (Green, 2003) is a brief, computerized program designed to measure an 
individual’s self-reported memory complaints. The measure has 58 items, responded to 
on a Likert scale, that comprise nine subscales: General Memory Problems, Numeric 
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Process Problems, Visual-Spatial Problems, Verbal Memory Problems, Pain Interferes 
with Memory, Memory Interferes with Work, Remote Memory Problems, Amnesia 
Complex Behavior, and Amnesia Antisocial Behavior. The first six scales list common 
memory complaints, while the final three include very rare and implausible memory 
complaints. These scales were designed to identify individuals who purposefully 
exaggerate memory complaints.  
Exploration into the psychometric properties of the MCI is ongoing, although 
some research is starting to suggest promising results (Flaro, Green, & Blaskewitz, in 
press). More specifically, the MCI Total Score has shown low correlations with actual 
measures of memory ability. Further, the MCI total score has been shown to more highly 
correlate with other measures of effort, such as the Word Memory Test (Green, 2003). 
These results suggest that the MCI shows divergent validity from well-validated 
measures of memory and higher convergent validity with measures of effort. The MCI 
took approximately ten minutes to complete. 
Integrity of Intervention Form (IIF). 
Subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire designed to evaluate 
whether they adhered to the scripts (as did Demakis, 1999 and Gorny & Merten, 2005) to 
help monitor the quality of the data collected. The IFF was designed to help descriptively 
assess the extent to which participants understood and internalized the script. This 
manipulation check included questions such as “How were you instructed to perform at 
the beginning of the session today?” and “Do you feel you did a good job of action as you 
were instructed?” The results from the IIF was used to create three categorical variables: 
Consistency (whether the participant’s report of their condition matched the actual 
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condition), Relative Performance (whether they participants felt they performed better 
than, worse than, or similar to how they would have performed in the absence of any 
instruction), and Simulation Success (whether the participant felt he/she did a good job of 
acting as instructed by the script). A copy of the IIF has been included as Appendix A. 
The IIF took approximately one minute to complete. 
 Effort Testing. 
 Medical Symptom Validity Test.  
The computerized version of the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 
2004) was used to assess effort. The MSVT presents individuals with ten word pairs 
twice, and then asks them to identify words from the original list (Immediate Recall; IR). 
After a delay of ten minutes, a recognition task is completed using different foils 
(Delayed Recall; DR). A Consistency (CS) score is calculated on how well the person 
performed across IR and DR conditions. The MSVT also included a Paired Recall (PR) 
and Free Recall (FR) trials. In the PR trial, the individual is provided the first word of the 
pair and the respondent required to provide the matched pair, whereas the FR trial 
requires the individual to recall as many words as they can from the original list, in any 
order. The PR and FR trial scores are considered more difficult than the IR, DR, and CS 
trials, and are typically analyzed individually. If a person shows stronger performance on 
the PR and/or FR trials than the IR, DR, or CS trials, it can be inferred the person 
purposefully minimized their performance on the early subtests. MSVT data were used to 
create a dichotomous variable labeled Effort Test Failure: Any individual who performed 
below 85% on the IR, DR, or CS was considered to fail effort testing. This variable 
corresponds to the clinical use of the MSVT to determine whether an individual provides 
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valid or invalid effort during an evaluation. Conversely, individuals who scored at or 
above 85% across the IR, DR, and CS scores were coded as passing. The decision to 
dichotomize effort as pass of fail mimics the use of the MSVT clinically to evaluate the 
validity of a respondent’s test results. The coding of the results from the MSVT as pass or 
fail also corresponds to current practice in research (i.e. Green, 2007; Green et al., 2001).  
The frequency of Effort Test Failure was compared by group.  
The MSVT (Green, 2004) has been shown to demonstrate near perfect sensitivity 
to poor effort in simulated adult and child malingerers (Green et al., 2009; Merten, Green, 
Henry, Blaskewitz, & Brockhaus, 2005; Singhal, Green, Ashaye, Shankar, & Adams, 
2009), and adults presenting for clinical evaluation (Carone, 2008). The MSVT has been 
shown to be insensitive to legitimate cognitive impairment as Carone (2008) 
demonstrated that even children with moderate-to-severe head injury pass at higher rates 
than adults with mild traumatic head injury. Similarly, children with significant cognitive 
impairment have been shown to pass the MSVT easily (Richman et al., 2006). Others 
(Singhal et al., 2009) have demonstrated low rates of false positives in cases of adults 
with documented dementia. Additionally, performance on the MSVT has been shown to 
correctly highly to performance on the WMT, suggesting strong convergent validity 
(Green, 2007). The MSVT, both immediate and delayed trials, took approximately fifteen 
minutes to complete.  
Symptom Report. 
Postconcussion Scale. 
The Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT; 
Lovell et al., 2000) includes a Postconcussion Scale that requires individuals to rate the 
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presence of 22 common symptoms of concussion on a scale of 1 to 7. These scores 
produce a Total Symptom Score. Total Symptom Score was compared across the groups. 
The test creator provides norm-based classifications for healthy adults ranging from Low 
to Very High. A variable was created, Symptom Impairment, with an unimpaired code 
assigned to symptom scores that fell in the Low-Normal to Normal range, and an 
impaired code assigned to score in the Unusual, High, and Very High range. This 
variable was meant to simulate the clinical decision of determining when an individual is 
free of symptoms in return to school, work, or play scenarios. 
The Postconcussion Scale has been shown to possess high internal consistency for 
both healthy (α = .88 - .94) and concussed individuals (α = .93) and shown high test-
retest reliability (.80) within the first several days of injury (Lovell, 2006).  
Neuropsychological Testing. 
Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing.  
The Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT; 
Lovell et al., 2000) was developed for use in an athletic environment and for use as a pre- 
and post-injury measure of the specific cognitive processes disrupted by concussion. The 
four composite scores (Verbal Memory, Visual Memory, Visual Motor Speed, and 
Reaction Time) were used as dependent measures to assess neuropsychological 
performance across groups.  
The ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) is a brief, computerized, neuropsychological 
measure that takes approximately twenty-five minutes to complete and is scored 
automatically. The ImPACT includes six individual subtests, each measuring a unique 
component of cognitive functioning: Word Memory (verbal recognition memory), Design 
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Memory (spatial recognition memory), X’s and O’s (visual working memory, processing 
speed), Symbol Match (memory, visual motor speed), Color Match (impulse inhibition, 
visual motor speed), Three Letters Memory (verbal working memory, processing speed). 
These scores then produce four composite scores: Verbal Memory, Visual Memory, 
Reaction Time, and Visual Motor Speed. Higher scores across the Verbal Memory, 
Visual Memory, and Visual Motor Speed composites indicate stronger performance. A 
lower score on the Reaction Time indicates stronger performance. The ImPACT test 
creators provide norms for healthy adults across each of the four composites.  
The ImPACT has been shown to demonstrate adequate psychometric properties as 
Iverson et al., (2003) found rates of test-retest reliability of the composite scores to range 
from .67 (Visual Memory) to .86 (Visual Motor Speed), with the Verbal memory (.70) 
and Reaction Time (.79) composites falling in between. The ImPACT has also been 
shown to be both sensitive (81.9%) and specific (89.4%) to the presence of concussion 
when the Symptom Score and four composite scores are combined (Schatz et al., 2006). 
The ImPACT composite scores have been shown to correlate with traditional 
neuropsychological measures (Iverson, Franzen, Lovell, & Collins, 2004). Specifically, 
the Visual and Verbal Memory composites showed a medium significant correlation to 
the Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised scores (BVMT-R; Benedict, 1997), which 
did not correlate to other ImPACT composite scores (i.e., Processing Speed and Reaction 
Time). Further, the Reaction Time and Visual Motor Speed composites have been shown 
to correlate with other measures of processing speed, such as the Symbol Digit Modality 
Test (SDMT; Smith, 1982). The Visual Motor Speed Composite has also been shown to 
correlate with the Trailmaking Test. Collectively, these results provide examples of the 
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convergent and divergent validity of the ImPACT composite scales. The ImPACT took 
approximately twenty-five minutes to complete. 
Symbol Digit Modality Test. 
The number of items correct from the written version of the Symbol Digit 
Modality Test (SDMT; Smith, 1982) was used in the current study as a secondary 
measure of participant’s neurocognitive functioning. The SDMT is designed to measures 
visual tracking, scanning, and motor speed. The measure presents individuals with a set 
of unique symbols paired with a unique target number. Respondents are required to 
quickly identify and write in the correct number for a series of symbols. The SDMT 
number of items correct was used as a dependent measure in the current study. The 
SDMT was chosen for use as previous research as it has been shown to be sensitive to the 
immediate effects of concussion (Barth et al., 1989), and accurately discriminate between 
individuals with head injury and healthy controls (Barr, 2001). The SDMT has also been 
shown to correlate strongly with the Processing Speed and Reaction Time Composite 
scores of ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000). Additionally, the SDMT has been shown to 
demonstrate stronger test-retest reliability than the ImPACT, ranging from .80 (Barr, 
2001) to .82 (Hinton-Bayre & Geffen, 2005). The SDMT also shows strong correlation to 
other measures of attention, concentration, and processing speed, including the Digit 
Symbol subtests of previous versions of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Barr, 
2001). The SDMT, including the teaching trial, took approximately three minutes to 
complete.   
A summary of the domains of measurement and corresponding measures is 
provided in Table 3. 
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 Demographic Information. 
Demographic Information Form. 
Subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire that recruited information 
about their age, educational level, athletic status, concussion history, and disability status. 
The Demographic Information Form has been included as Appendix B. The measure was 
designed to help identify individuals who met exclusionary criteria based upon diagnoses 
of attention and/or learning disabilities. In addition, demographic characteristics were 
examined to describe each group and ensure equivalence across the groups on the 
aforementioned demographic categories. The demographic form took approximately two 
minutes to complete. 
Group Membership. 
Script of Experimental Condition. 
The scripts were constructed such that participants in each group were asked to 
pretend they had sustained a concussion and provided the common list of symptoms. As 
the work of Gorny and Merten (2005) suggests, the more detailed the information 
provided to the participants, the more likely they will be able to successfully minimize 
their effort while also avoiding effort test failure. Injury-related information, such as 
method of injury and the common symptoms of concussion are held constant in each 
incentive condition. Each script provided a unique, but parallel, incentive condition: 
academic accommodations (Fake Bad), return to play (Fake Good), or no incentive. The 
incentive conditions between the Fake Good and Fake Bad groups were designed to 
present parallel but opposing motivations for simulating performance. The Fake Bad 
group was provided the following incentive condition: 
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You are also being asked to pretend that you are currently a senior in 
college and preparing to take the Graduate Record Exam (GRE).  The test 
is next weekend.  If you do well on the GRE, your chances of getting into 
a good graduate program are greater.  If you do poorly on the GRE, you 
will likely have to wait to apply to graduate programs until you are able to 
get more experience in your area of study.   
 
College students who have a concussion can qualify for extended time on 
the GRE.  To ensure you receive extended time on the upcoming GRE, 
you will need to perform on the following tasks in a way that suggests you 
are suffering from the symptoms of concussion. 
 
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following 
measures. 
 
 The Fake Good group was provided the following incentive condition: 
 
You are also being asked to pretend that you are a senior in college and 
the starting point guard on the basketball team.  The big game is next 
weekend.  If you do well in the game, your chances of getting onto a good 
professional team are greater.  If you do poorly in the game, you will 
likely have to wait to try out for professional teams until you are able to 
get more experience at your position.   
 
College students who have a concussion can be removed from athletic 
competition to avoid further injury.  To ensure you can play in the 
upcoming game, you will need to perform on the following tasks in a way 
that suggests that you are not suffering from the symptoms of concussion.   
 
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following 
measures. 
 
Prior to use in the current study, the experimental scripts were piloted with 
volunteers recruited from the Psychology Department at Syracuse University. The 
volunteers included graduate and undergraduate research assistants. Volunteers were 
randomly assigned scripts from one of the three conditions and asked to complete a brief 
symptom report adapted from the ImPACT Postconcussion Scale (Lovell et al., 2000). 
The results from this piloting showed the volunteers were able to understand the language 
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of the scripts, internalize the incentive condition, and modify their symptom report as 
instructed. The experimental script for each condition has been included as Appendix C.   
Procedures  
All data collection was conducted in a lab with ten computers connected to the 
internet. Each of the data collection sessions were run by the primary investigator. Across 
all sessions, the primary investigator tracked the steps completed using a copy of the 
Experimenter Script (Appendix D). During 11 of 21 (52%) of the data collection 
sessions, a research assistant was present to assist with procedural integrity and 
administration of the protocol. In the experimental sessions, the procedural integrity 
estimate was approximately 99%. The cause for disagreements came from word errors in 
reading the script. Prior to the participants’ arrival, all computers were prepared by 
loading the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000), MSVT (Green, 2004), and MCI (Green, 2003) 
programs so that each participant completed all computerized measures on a single 
computer. A blank piece of paper was placed over each computer screen to prevent 
participants from engaging with the materials prior to use. A paper participant packet, 
including the consent document, a written script of the experimental condition, SDMT, 
MSVT delayed, Integrity of Intervention Form, and Demographic Form was placed in 
front of each computer, along with two pencils. All participant packets followed this 
fixed order.  
Upon presenting for participation, individuals were randomly assigned one of 
three incentive groups: No Incentive, return to play (Fake Good), or academic 
accommodations (Fake Bad). Every data collection session began with the primary 
investigator explaining the study and reading the consent document aloud. All 
  
 
49 
 
participants signed the paper-and-pencil consent document prior to participation in the 
study. Participants were then asked to read the Experimental Script that described 
concussion, the incentive condition, and instructions on how to perform to obtain the 
incentive. Participants were given approximately five minutes to read the scripts. 
Once participants had read the script, they were directed to remove the paper 
covering their computer screen, instructed to read the ImPACT’s (Lovell et al., 2000) 
instructions, and reminded to act in the manner described in the script. The ImPACT 
program automatically prompted students through the Postconcussion Scale and each of 
the six subtests. After the participants completed the ImPACT, the primary investigator 
or research assistant accessed computerized version of the MSVT (Green, 2004), covered 
the monitor with a piece of blank paper, and instructed the participant to wait quietly. 
Once all participants had finished the ImPACT, participants were instructed to review 
their paper script. They were given approximately one minute to review the information. 
Next, they were reminded to act as instructed and directed to the MSVT loaded on their 
computer screen. After participants completed the MSVT, the primary investigator or 
research assistant minimized the MSVT, loaded the computerized version of the MCI 
(Green, 2003), and placed a blank piece of paper over the computer screen. Participants 
were instructed to sit quietly while waiting for the others to finish. When all the 
participants had completed the MSVT, the participants were allowed to review their 
scripts for another minute. Next, participants were reminded to perform in the manner 
explained in the script, and directed to the computer screen where they were provided 
instructions to complete the MCI. As participants completed the MCI, the primary 
investigator or research assistant minimized the MCI, maximized the MSVT, placed the 
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blank paper over the computer screen, and reminded the participant to sit quietly while 
waiting for the other participants to finish. Once all participants had completed the MCI, 
the participants were instructed to turn to the SDMT (Smith, 1982) in their participant 
packet. Participants were provided instructions on how to complete the SDMT and asked 
to complete the first ten items. The primary investigator and research assistant checked to 
ensure each participant understood the task. Then participants were reminded to perform 
in the manner instructed in their script, and administered the SDMT. Once all participants 
completed the SDMT, they were instructed to return to the MSVT delayed task on their 
computer screen; as participants finished, they were instructed to place the blank sheet 
over the computer screen and sit quietly. Next, the participants were prompted through 
the paper-and-pencil Paired Recall and Free Recall portions of the MSVT as a group. 
Finally, the group was instructed to independently complete the Integrity of Intervention 
Form and Demographic Information Form. Once all participants completed these forms, 
the group was thanked for their help, asked to verify their identity for the purposes of 
assigning credit, and given credit for participation via SONA. Each data collection 
session lasted approximately 60 minutes.    
Research Design and Statistical Analyses 
 The current study was designed as an analog study with a between-subjects 
experimental design, with group being the primary independent variable. The dependent 
variables of interest included: effort test failure (MSVT; Green, 2004), symptom 
impairment, symptom report, and neuropsychological test performance (ImPACT; Lovell 
et al., 2000, SDMT; Smith, 1982). A chi-square analysis was used to compare rates of 
effort test failure between the groups and frequency of impaired-range symptom report by 
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group. Follow-up pairwise chi-square analyses were adopted to further explore group 
differences in effort test failure. Effect sizes corresponding to chi-square analyses were 
Cramer’s phi (ɸc) for omnibus tests, while the phi coefficient (ɸ) for post-hoc 
comparisons. Both Cramer’s phi and phi have similar ranges of interpretation as follows: 
.10 small effect, .30 medium effect, and .50 large effect. To compare omnibus group 
differences in symptom report, a Kruskal-Wallis (see next section) test was used, and 
followed by Mann-Whitney post-hoc tests when omnibus group effects were found. 
Effect sizes for Kruskal-Wallis tests were reported as eta-squared (µ²) and relied upon the 
following conventions: .01 small effect, .06 medium effect, and .16 large effect. Effect 
sizes for Mann-Whitney tests are reported as r with the following conventions for 
analysis: .10 small effect, .30 medium effect, and .50 large effect. Group differences on 
neuropsychological measures, including the SDMT and four ImPACT Index scores, were 
compared using five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests with follow-up Mann-Whitney post-
hoc tests when omnibus group effects were found. Finally, five separate Kruskal-Wallis 
tests were utilized to compare the differences in neuropsychological test scores in 
individuals who passed effort testing and those who failed, regardless of group. Across 
omnibus and post-hoc procedures, Bonferroni corrections were utilized to control for the 
effect of repeated contrasts.  
Results 
Assessment for Violation of Assumptions 
Exploratory data analyses (Tukey, 1977) were utilized to determine whether the 
assumptions of parametric statistical procedures were met. Across all dependent 
variables, the data did not follow a normal distribution and demonstrated significant skew 
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and kurtosis. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality was used to evaluate the 
significance of these effects. The results indicated that each of the dependent variables 
followed a non-normal distribution for at least one of the groups (alpha level .05). 
Accordingly, it was decided that analogous non-parametric statistical analyses would be 
employed rather than attempting to transform the data. Thus, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance was utilized to explore differences in symptom report by group and 
Mann-Whitney U tests were utilized to explore post-hoc comparisons. The Kruskal-
Wallis test is analogous to ANOVA but tests group differences based upon ranks, rather 
than means. Scores are ranked for each participant, and sum ranks are computed for each 
group. The Mann-Whitney test is parallel to a t test for independent samples but does not 
assume central tendency of the samples. Five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests were utilized 
to examine group differences in each of the four ImPACT (Lovell et. al, 2000) Index 
scores and SDMT (Smith, 1982) score. When omnibus group effects were identified, a 
Mann-Whitney U post-hoc procedure was used to further explain group differences. Chi-
square tests were used to explore the frequency of effort test failure and symptom 
impairment between groups. Post hoc comparisons were made using chi-square tests with 
the two groups of interest. Bonferroni corrections were employed to account for repeated 
contrasts and the corresponding alpha levels are reported in the results section. 
Results of the Manipulation Check 
Before analyzing the data, group performance from the General Memory 
Complaints subscale of the MCI (Green, 2003) was explored to determine whether 
participants performed as instructed by their script. The MCI creators provide a mean 
MCI score 7.11 (SD = 5.14) compiled from 108 healthy adults, to which mean group 
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scores from the current study were compared. The Fake Bad group showed a mean MCI 
score of 12.38 (SD = 4.97), the Fake Good group 2.58 (SD = 4.67), and the No Incentive 
group 11.26 (SD = 6.57). Additionally, 81.13% of the participants in the Fake Bad group 
showed a mean MCI score greater than 7.11, while 67.89% of the No Incentive 
participants obtained a higher MCI average than the healthy adults. Only 9.68% of the 
Fake Good participants showed a higher MCI mean score than the healthy adults. In sum, 
these patterns of performance indicate that the Fake Bad group endorsed more memory 
complaints than both healthy adults, and members of the Fake Good and No Incentive 
groups. These results are commensurate with the expectation that the Fake Bad group 
would report the highest number of memory complaints, with the Fake Good and No 
Incentive groups reporting fewer. Further, the results indicate that the manipulation was 
effective in influencing participants self-reported memory complaints.  
Data collected from the IIF further supported the effectiveness of the 
manipulation. First, the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups were able to accurately recall 
their experimental condition, as 96% and 89% of participants correctly identified group 
membership, respectively. Of the No Incentive group, 59% of the participants correctly 
identified their condition. The consistency score varied significantly by group, χ² (2, n = 
171) = 28.43, p < 0.001, ɸc = 0.41. Of the entire sample (n = 171), 81% of participants 
were able to correctly identify their condition. Relative performance data revealed that 
participants in the Fake Good group tended to report that they performed as instructed, 
with 90% reporting they performed similar to or better than they would have absent 
specific instructions. A majority of participants in the Fake Bad group, 68%, reported 
they performed worse than typical. Of the No Incentive group, 45% indicated they 
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performed worse than typical, 27% indicated they performed as well as usual, and 28% 
indicated they performed better than usual. Across groups, participants reported they did 
a good job of performing as instructed with 87% of the Fake Good group, 83% of the 
Fake Bad group, and 73% of the No Incentive group reporting successful simulation. 
Together, the results from the IIF and MCI (Green, 2003) lend credence to the 
assumption that participants would perform as instructed by their experimental scripts. 
Given that participants were able to successfully modify a self-report of memory 
complaints, identify their experimental condition, match test performance to their 
condition, and were satisfied with their adherence to the protocol, it was assumed that the 
scripts were sufficient to produce the intended alteration of performance across domains.  
Symptom Report 
Based upon the successful manipulation and the a priori hypothesis that symptom 
report would vary by group, group differences in symptom report from the 
Postconcussion Scale of the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) were explored. The 
Postconcussion Scale produces a Total Symptom Score for each participant, which were 
compared between groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test. The results indicated a large and 
significant difference between the mean rank of symptom score by group, H(2, n = 171) 
= 58.21, p < .001, µ² = .34, with the mean rank of 112.57 the Fake Bad, 48.07 for the 
Fake Good, and 102.85 for the No Incentive groups. Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
between the groups were conducted using the Mann-Whitney U test with a Bonferroni 
correction for repeated contrasts (α = .017). The results indicated a large and significant 
difference between the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, U = 426.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < 
.001, r = .51. The Fake Bad group had an average rank of 80.95, while the Fake Good 
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had an average rank of 38.38. A moderate and significant difference was also found 
between the Fake Good and No Incentive groups, U = 601.00, nˡ = 62, n² = 56, p < .001, r 
= .41, where the Fake Good group had a mean rank of 41.19 and the No Incentive group 
showing a mean rank of 79.77. No significant difference was found between the Fake 
Bad and No Incentive groups, U = 1292.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 56, p = .25. The Fake Bad group 
had an average rank of 58.61 while the No Incentive group had an average rank of 51.58.  
To further explore the differences in symptom report by group, the impairment 
variable created from the Postconcussion Scale norms (Lovell, et al., 2000) was used. 
Each participant was given a dichotomous score of Impaired or Unimpaired. An 
unimpaired code was assigned to symptom scores that fell in the Low-Normal to Normal 
range, and an impaired code assigned to score in the Unusual, High, and Very High 
range. A chi-square test was used to compare the frequency of impairment by group. The 
results indicated a strong and significant difference by group, χ² (2, n = 171) = 43.03, p < 
0.001, ɸc = 0.50. Follow up pairwise comparisons between the groups’ frequencies of 
impairment were conducted using the Chi-square test with a Bonferroni correction for 
repeated contrasts (α = .017). A strong and significant difference was found between the 
frequency of impaired ratings of the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, χ² (1, n = 115) = 
30.16, p < .001, ɸ = .51. A moderately strong and significant difference was also found 
between the Fake Good and No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 118) = 20.13, p < .001, ɸ = 
.41. No significant difference was found in the frequency of impairment between the 
Fake Bad and No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 109) = 3.93, p = .05. Within group analysis 
of symptom impairment indicated that all participants in the Fake Bad group (n=53) 
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reported impaired range symptom scores, while approximately 56% of the Fake Good 
and 93% of the No Incentive groups reported Impaired range scores.  
Overall, these results suggest the groups differed across both the frequency of 
impairment and the average rank of symptom report. As expected, the Fake Bad group 
reported significantly more symptoms and more frequently reported impaired range 
symptoms than the Fake Good group. Unexpectedly, No Incentive group also reported 
more frequent impairment and more symptoms than the Fake Good group. Together, 
these results partially confirm the hypothesis that the Fake Bad group would show 
significantly higher symptom report than the Fake Good group and No Incentive group. 
These results are summarized in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
Neuropsychological Test Performance 
  It was expected that the Fake Bad group would perform significantly worse than 
the No Incentive and Fake Good groups across measures of neuropsychological test 
performance, including the ImPACT (Lovell, et al., 2004) composite scores and the 
SDMT (Smith, 1982). Group performance across each of the four composite scores of the 
ImPACT and SDMT was explored by using five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests. A 
Bonferroni correction was employed given the number of tests run, which resulted in an 
alpha of .01. The groups showed significant differences in performance across each of the 
neuropsychological scores: Verbal Memory, H(2, n = 171) = 37.31, p < .001, µ² = .22, 
Visual Memory, H(2, n = 171) = 34.23, p < .001, µ² = .20, Visual Motor Speed, H(2, n = 
171) = 32.28, p <.001, µ² = .19, Reaction Time, H(2, n = 171)=14.89, p = .001, µ² = .09, 
and SDMT score, H(2, n = 171) = 33.20, p < .001, µ² = .20. Across the ImPACT 
composite scores and SDMT, the groups showed the same pattern of responding, with the 
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Fake Bad group showing the weakest performance, followed by the No Incentive group, 
and the Fake Good group showing the strongest performance. These results are 
summarized in Table 7. 
 To further evaluate the significance of group differences across each of the 
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) composite scores and SDMT (Smith, 1982), pairwise 
comparisons between the groups were conducted using the Mann-Whitney U test with a 
Bonferroni correction for repeated contrasts (α = .0025). The results indicated that the 
Fake Bad and Fake Good groups showed significantly different performance across each 
of the ImPACT composites and SDMT, with the Fake Good showing significantly 
stronger performance across the measures: Verbal Memory, U = 634.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, 
p < .001, r = .53, Visual Memory, U = 709.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .48, Visual 
Motor Speed, U = 674.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .51, Reaction Time, U = 
1023.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p = .001, r = .32, and SDMT, U = 622.00, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < 
.001, r = .53. The results further suggested small (Reaction Time) to moderate (Verbal 
Memory, Visual Memory, and Visual Motor Speed) effect sizes for the significant 
differences between the groups across the ImPACT and a large effect size across the 
SDMT. The results indicated that the No Incentive group showed significantly weaker 
performance than the Fake Good group across each of the ImPACT composites and 
SDMT: Verbal Memory, U = 923.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .40, Visual Memory, 
U = 871.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .43, Visual Motor Speed, U = 1025.50, nˡ = 56, 
n² = 62, p < .001, r = .35, Reaction Time, U = 1174.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .002, r = .28, 
and SDMT, U = 1048.00, nˡ = 62, n² = 56, p < .001, r = .34. The results suggested small 
(Visual Motor Speed and Reaction Time) to moderate (SDMT, Verbal Memory, and 
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Visual Memory) effect sizes for the significant differences between groups. As with the 
previous findings in the domains of symptom report and effort testing, the Fake Bad and 
No Incentive Groups were not found to differ significantly across the ImPACT composite 
scores or SDMT: Verbal Memory, U = 1157.00, nˡ = 53, n² = 56, p = .05, Visual Memory 
(U = 1308.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .29, Visual Motor Speed (U = 1176.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 
62, p = .06), Reaction Time (U = 1350.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .42), and SDMT, U = 
1224.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .115. These comparisons are summarized in Table 8. 
Effort Testing 
 Data collected from the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004) 
produced five scores: Immediate Recall (IR), Delayed Recall (DR), Consistency (CS), 
Paired Recall (PR), and Free Recall (FR). Group performance on the MSVT is 
descriptively summarized in Table 9. As indicated by the user manual, individuals are 
considered to have given suspect effort with a score of < 85% on IR, DR, or CS (Green, 
2004). A variable was created to capture performance across these three subtests such 
that performance below 85% on any one of these three scores was coded as an effort test 
failure, and performance of 85% and above across the subtests was coded as an effort test 
pass. To test the hypothesis that the groups would differ in their rate of effort test failure, 
the percentage of group members who passed effort testing was calculated for each 
group. It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad group would show the highest rate of effort 
test failure with the No Incentive and Fake Good groups showing significantly lower 
rates of failure. As expected, the Fake Bad group showed the lowest rate of passing effort 
testing with 35.8% of the group passing; the No Incentive had a passing rate of 55.4%, 
while the Fake Good group had a passing rate of 96.8 %.  
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To further explore group differences in MSVT (Green, 2004) performance, the 
frequency of effort test failure by group was compared using a chi-square test. The results 
showed significantly different rates of effort test failure by group, χ² (2, n = 171) = 49.14, 
p < .001, ɸc = .54. Follow up pairwise comparisons between the groups were conducted 
using chi-square tests with a Bonferroni correction for repeated contrasts (α = .017). A 
strong and significant difference was found between the frequency of effort test failure of 
the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, χ² (1, n = 115) = 49.32, p < .001, ɸ = .66. A 
significant and moderately strong difference was also found between the Fake Good and 
No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 118) = 28.60, p < .001, ɸ = .49. A significant difference 
was not found in the frequency of effort test failure between the Fake Bad and No 
Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 109) = 4.17, p = .04. The results from the MSVT are 
summarized in Table 10. 
To explore the relationship between effort test failure and neuropsychological test 
performance, five Mann-Whitney U  tests were utilized to compare those who passed 
effort testing and those who failed (regardless of group membership) across each of the 
neuropsychological measures. A Bonferroni correction was utilized to reflect the large 
number of repeated contrasts (α = .01). Significant group differences were found across 
each of the neuropsychological measures: Verbal Memory, U = 700.00, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, 
p < .001, r = .65, Visual Memory, U = 958.00, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .59, Visual 
Motor Speed, U = 999.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .58, Reaction Time U = 
1415.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .48, and SDMT U = 1010.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p 
< .001, r = .58), such that those who passed effort testing showed significantly stronger 
performance across each measure. Table 10 includes a summary of these data. 
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 Collectively, these results partially confirm the hypothesis that the groups would 
show significantly different performance across neuropsychological measures. A 
significant omnibus effect for group was found across the ImPACT (Lovell, et al., 2000) 
and SDMT (Smith, 1982), with the Fake Bad group showing significantly weaker 
performance than the Fake Good group across measures. Unexpectedly, the No Incentive 
group showed similar performance to the Fake Bad group, and significantly weaker 
performance than the Fake Good group, across each of the neuropsychological measures. 
The results showed that individuals who passed effort testing showed significantly 
stronger performance than those who failed, across neuropsychological measures. 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the current study was to evaluate whether incentives for 
modifying performance would influence the symptom report, neuropsychological test 
performance, and effort test failure in individuals instructed to pretend as though they had 
recently sustained a concussion. The results support two major findings. First, the data 
suggest that the symptoms and neurocognitive impairment of concussion can be faked. 
Second, poor effort is of significant concern when evaluating neuropsychological test 
data.  
The results of the current study showed that the symptoms of concussion are 
easily faked in both directions. As expected, the Fake Bad group showed a higher rate of 
impairment than the Fake Good group as measured by the Postconcussion Scale of the 
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000). The No Incentive group, which was only provided 
information on the symptoms of concussion, also showed a higher impairment rate than 
the Fake Good group. Further, 100% of the Fake Bad group reported Impaired range 
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symptoms, while 93% and 56% of the No Incentive and Fake Good group participants 
reported Impaired range symptoms, respectively. These results provide support to the 
conclusion that even after a short exposure to a list of symptoms, participants instructed 
to fake bad were able to modify their symptom report to match clinical levels. When 
compared to the symptom report of athletes with concussion provided by the ImPACT 
manual (Lovell, 2006), participants in the No Incentive and Fake Bad groups showed 
higher symptom report. In both the current study and comparable studies (Harrison, 
Edwards, & Parker, 2007; Martin, Hayes, Gouvier, 1996), participants were able to 
willfully create symptoms indicative of impairment related to ADHD and concussion, 
respectively. These data illustrate the need for multiple measures of impairment when 
working with individuals who present with common symptoms of concussion, such as 
headache, fatigue, and irritability, who may have an incentive to exaggerate or fake 
symptoms. 
The current study also identified significant differences in neuropsychological test 
performance by group. The No Incentive and Fake Bad group showed consistently 
weaker performance across neuropsychological measures than the Fake Good group. 
Group membership was found to account for between 9-22% of the variance in 
neuropsychological test scores. Collectively, these results provide evidence that 
individuals in the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups, who over-reported the subjective 
symptoms of concussion, also showed a decline in their objective performance on 
commonly used psychological measures. Although the current study did not recruit a 
comparison group of individuals with legitimate concussion, others have evaluated the 
neurocognitive performance of individuals with concussion using similar methods as the 
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current study. Specifically, Broglio, Macciocchi, and Ferrara (2007) administered the 
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) to a small sample (n = 21) of concussed college athletes. 
Other investigators (Iverson, Lovell, & Collins, 2005; Schatz, Pardini, Lovell, Collins, & 
Podell, 2006) tracked the neurocognitive performance of concussed high school students 
following concussion. Both the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups from the current study 
showed weaker performance across the ImPACT composites and SDMT (Smith, 1982) 
than individuals with legitimate concussion. Similar patterns of performance were found 
in research on groups with concussion and ADHD (Green, 2007; Green et al., 2001; 
Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007; Martin, Hayes, & Gouvier, 1996). These studies 
tended to show that not only are the general and subjective symptoms of certain disorders 
and injuries easy to fake, but so are the neurocognitive deficits typically associated with 
these disorders or injuries. These results also suggest that individuals who fake clinical 
disorders show weaker performance than those with legitimate clinical diagnoses.   
The current study also identified significant differences in the rate of effort test 
failure by group. The Fake Bad group showed the highest rate of effort test failure 
(64.2%), followed by the No Incentive group (44.6%), and the Fake Good group (3.2%). 
Further, the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups showed a significantly higher rate of 
effort test failure than the Fake Good group. The current results are similar to those found 
by others (Green et al., 2009; Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007) who reported that both 
children and adults can easily modify their performance to pass or fail effort testing when 
provided instruction to do so. Other studies have found that symptom validity tests are 
insensitive to the effects of explicit instruction on how to perform in a manner to avoid 
detection (Brennan, Meyer, David, Pella, Hill, & Gouvier, 2009; Jelicic, Ceunen, Peters, 
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& Merckelbach, 2011). However, these studies are not specific to concussion, and more 
research in the area of effort testing needs to be completed before conclusions can be 
made about the sensitivity of effort tests to feigned head injury. Further, these results 
suggest that non-monetary incentives, such as the return to sports participation or the 
provision of academic accommodations, can influence performance in a significant and 
predictable manner. While research in the area of ADHD and learning disabilities 
(Constantineau et al., 2005; Harrison, 2006; Sullivan et al., 2007) has begun to suggest 
that a subset of students willfully malinger symptoms in an attempt to obtain academic 
incentives, these results are the first to suggest the incentives may be appealing to 
individuals with concussion. Additionally, recent work has shown that both typical and 
disabled students rated extended time as a highly desirable test accommodation, 87.1% 
and 88.3% respectively (Lewandowski, Lovett, Panahon, Lambert, & Systma, 2012). 
Given the notion that even typical students may find academic accommodations to be 
appealing incentives, and the ease with which the common symptoms of concussion can 
be simulated, the need for increased awareness and use of effort measures is clear.  
While group membership accounted for a significant portion of the variance in 
neuropsychological test scores, effort also played a significant role in performance. Those 
who passed effort testing showed significantly stronger performance across 
neuropsychological measures. These results indicate that effort, regardless of incentive 
condition, explained between 23% and 42% of the variance in neuropsychological test 
performance. These findings are consistent with those of Green et al. (2001) who found 
that effort explained 53% of the variance in neuropsychological test performance of 
individuals with head injury. In the same study, education (11%) and age (4%) accounted 
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for far less variance than effort. Overall, these results provide compelling evidence that 
effort should be considered when analyzing neuropsychological test results, especially 
when the individual may have incentive to fake bad.   
 Surprisingly, across all measures the No Incentive group consistently performed 
in a manner similar to the Fake Bad group, rather than the Fake Good group. Although it 
was initially expected that the No Incentive group would show weaker performance than 
the Fake Good group and stronger performance than the Fake Bad group across domains, 
there exist several explanations for why an alternative pattern was observed. First, in the 
No Incentive condition, participants were given no explicit information on how to modify 
their performance. While all groups were provided information on concussion and the 
common side effects, the Fake Good group was given explicit instruction to minimize 
symptom report and maximize performance to ensure the return to athletic play. In 
contrast, the Fake Bad group was instructed to maximize symptom report and depress test 
performance. The lack of explicit instruction to the No Incentive group may have made it 
more difficult for participants to assess how strong or weak to perform. This explanation 
seems to be supported by several pieces of data. First, the No Incentive group showed the 
most difficulty identifying its experimental condition, with 58.9% of the group correctly 
reporting group membership. The No Incentive group was significantly less accurate than 
the Fake Bad (96.2%) and Fake Good (88.7%) groups’ rate of correct identification. The 
majority of the No Incentive group who incorrectly identified their group (56.5%) 
reported they had been instructed to pretend they were a student preparing to take the 
GRE, while the other 44.5% indicated they were instructed to pretend to be an athlete 
seeking to return to play. Of the participants in the No Incentive group who incorrectly 
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identified their group, only 35.8% (8 of 23) reported that they had not done a good job of 
following the script. Of these participants, 87.5% reported they had become confused or 
forgotten how to respond during the session. Interestingly, 55.3% of the No Incentive 
condition participants reported that they performed the same as or better than they would 
have in the absence of the experimental script. These data suggest that participants in the 
No Incentive group may have been confused about their instructions or struggled to 
anchor their performance to a reference point in the absence of actual impairment. 
Despite the self-reported difficulties of the No Incentive group, it is important to note that 
they appeared to internalize the experimental script. The group consistently performed in 
a manner indicative of concussion, across measures. Although participants reported 
confusion, they were able to successfully simulate impairment across measures.  
Limitations 
 Despite the robust differences in symptom report, neuropsychological test 
performance, and effort test failure by group, the current study is not without limitation. 
The most salient of these limitations are inherent to the use of a simulation design, 
including four characteristics: Lack of comparison groups, absence of true incentives, 
language used in the scripts, and reliance on conscious motivations for performance.  
Perhaps most notably, the study recruited a healthy sample of undergraduate 
students, rather than concussed individuals. Also, the current study did not recruit a 
comparison group of healthy participants, which would have provided frame of reference 
for delineating the current results. It would have been valuable to compare symptom 
report, effort test failure, and neuropsychological test performance to a healthy 
comparison group recruited from the same population.  
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Although comparison groups of concussed and healthy individuals were not 
recruited, comparisons between the current study and similar research are informative. 
When the data from the current study were compared to similar data collected from 
concussed athletes (Broglio, Macciocchi, & Ferrara, 2007; Iverson et al., 2005; Schatz et 
al., 2007), interesting trends emerge. First, athletes with concussion reported similar 
symptom scores to the Fake Good group, which are much lower than those of the Fake 
Bad and No Incentive groups. The Fake Good group showed a much larger range of 
scores and higher variability in symptom report than both concussed athletes and the 
Fake Bad and No Incentive groups. Across the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000), the Fake 
Good group showed stronger performance than concussed athletes and the Fake Bad and 
No Incentive groups. Table 11 provides a summary of these data. This comparison, albeit 
indirect, suggests that participants in the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups demonstrated 
higher symptom report and weaker neuropsychological test performance than individuals 
with concussion. This comparison also shows that individuals who simulate concussion 
may actually perform worse than individuals with concussion. A similar pattern has been 
demonstrated by the work of Green and colleagues (Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 
2001; Green et al., 2009). Work in the areas of ADHD and learning disabilities have also 
shown that individuals who fake bad tend to perform worse than those with legitimate 
diagnoses (Harrison et al., 2007; Lindstrom et al., 2009).     
A secondary effect of failing to include a healthy comparison groups is that it is 
difficult to evaluate whether participants in the Fake Good group were able to optimize 
their performance. However, it is valuable to consider the low rate of effort test failure 
(3.2%) demonstrated by the Fake Good group is than the rate of effort test failure in 
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healthy volunteers in the absence of incentives, which has been shown to range between 
11-17% (Hunt et al, 2007; Kirkwood & Kirk, 2010). In comparing the No Incentive 
groups to test-based norms from the MCI (Green, 2003), the No Incentive group reported 
fewer general memory complaints. These data provide some evidence to suggest that the 
Fake Good group in the current study appeared to purposefully maximize test 
performance. 
The results from the current study are further limited in that participant’s actual 
performance had no implications for the attainment of academic accommodations or the 
return to athletic play. More specifically, while the incentives used represent “real world” 
scenarios that may influence performance, the current study did not provide actual 
incentives for performance. Regardless of experimental group, participants’ performance 
had no legitimate consequence for their academic and athletic standing, or even the credit 
they earned for participating in the experiment. Further, given that no real incentive was 
attached to performance, it seems unlikely that the same cognitive or emotional demands 
of malingering were activated in the participants. Also, the incentives presented in the 
current study may not have represented salient goals for the participants, given that they 
represented a healthy, uninjured sample. Despite the lack of realism with the incentives, 
robust effects were found across symptom report and neuropsychological test 
performance by group and highlight future directions for research.  
The experimental scripts may have also limited the internal validity of the current 
study. This appears to salient concern for the No Incentive condition, in which 
participants had more difficulty than participants from the other groups correctly 
identifying their experimental condition and reported they became confused about how to 
  
 
68 
 
perform. Simply put, a substantial portion of the No Incentive group simply did not know 
how to perform. This finding is interesting in that it suggests that individuals can more 
easily fake a disorder when provided explicit instruction on how to do so.  
Of additional concern are the participant’s conceptions of the information 
contained within the experimental scripts. The current study required participants to 
pretend to have sustained a minor head injury, but also pretend to be seeking an external 
gain. Both simulation factors could be susceptible to individual differences of the 
participants. For example, participants may have varied in their conceptualization of 
symptoms of concussion. Across groups, participants were asked to imagine they had 
sustained a concussion as a result of a car accident; some participants may have imagined 
a minor car accident, while others imagined a major collision. Participants in the Fake 
Bad and Fake Good groups were also asked to pretend to be preparing for the Graduate 
Record Exam or an important basketball game. For some students, these may not have 
represented important incentives, and this may have impacted their ability to assume the 
instructed role. Participants may have varied in their ability to estimate how they would 
perform on such tests normally let alone how to perform given an imaginary incentive. It 
is conceivable that it may have been difficult for participants to keep their typical 
performance, injury scenario, and incentive condition in mind while attempting to 
complete the measures. Although participants were frequently prompted to review their 
experimental script, it may have presented a cognitive challenge to continually monitor 
performance. Some participants may have varied in their willingness to purposefully 
modify their performance, regardless of condition. Subjects were provided an opportunity 
to disclose poor adherence to the protocol, without penalty, via the Integrity of 
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Intervention Form, but some participants may not have felt comfortable disclosing their 
failure to act as instructed.  
It is important to note the lack of standardization of the experimental scripts. 
Although the scripts were designed to be equivalent in length and content, they were 
created by the author for use in the study. The verbiage used may have influenced group 
performance, in addition to the incentive presented. For example, each of the groups was 
told that concussion represents a mild head injury. Further, each of the groups was primed 
to pretend that they had recently sustained a concussion. It appears that these factors may 
have influenced group performance in several ways. First, it seems that individuals in 
each of the groups showed high reliance upon the experimental scripts. The Fake Bad 
group, despite being told to exaggerate impairment, showed similar performance to the 
No Incentive group. This suggests that the Fake Bad group may have relied heavily upon 
the clue of mild head injury. Conversely, the No Incentive group, absent incentive, 
appeared to rely upon the information about impairment and symptoms, and successfully 
simulated concussion. The influence of the script and the salience of the information may 
partially explain why the Fake Good group showed a higher report of symptoms than 
what may be expected. It will be important that future research explore the components 
of script that appear to be most related to feigned performance. 
In the current study, poor performance (i.e., elevated symptom report, low 
neuropsychological test performance, and effort test failure) was conceptualized as a 
conscious choice. Individuals who failed effort testing were assumed to have done so in 
an attempt to appear impaired by concussion. However, this assumption ignores the 
unconscious motivations that may influence their clinical presentation. For example, 
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“diagnosis threat” was first used by Surh and Gunstead (2002) to explain how an 
individual with concussion show low performance on a task because they are primed to 
believe that individuals with concussion are generally regarded as performing poorly on 
the task. It may be the case that simply exposing individuals to the symptoms of 
concussion influenced their performance across measures, rather than the incentive 
condition. Accordingly, it is plausible that there may be alternative, unconscious factors 
that contributed to participants’ performance that went unmeasured. It may be the case 
that exploring these unconscious factors would help explain effort test failure in 10-17% 
of healthy individuals in the absence of incentives (Hunt et al, 2007; Kirkwood & Kirk, 
2010). 
With the limitations to the internal and external validity in mind, the results are 
among the first to suggest that non-monetary incentives to modify performance may 
influence the psychological test results in individuals seeking these incentives. Consistent 
and robust differences were found between the Fake Good and Fake Bad groups across 
measures of effort, symptom report, and neuropsychological test performance. The 
importance of effort is highlighted as the current results show a strong and significant 
relationship between effort and performance on neuropsychological measures.  
Future Directions for Research 
The limitations of the current study inform directions for future research. Given 
the lack of generalizability to a clinical sample, it is imperative to explore the differences 
in test performance between individuals with actual concussion with individuals 
instructed to feign concussion. This will allow for a direct comparison of neurocognitive 
performance between these groups.  
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The current study suggests that the provision of academic accommodations and 
return to sports play may be salient incentives to modify performance, especially in a 
college setting. The current data suggest that concussion is easily faked, while others 
have recently illustrated the desirability of academic accommodations (Lewandowski et 
al., 2012). Continued exploration into the appeal of these incentives for individuals with 
concussion will further inform our clinical practices. Concurrently, we should continue to 
investigate whether healthy students find these (and other) incentives appealing enough 
to modify symptom report and/or neurocognitive test performance. By measuring the 
desirability of common incentives, such as access to monetary reimbursement, reduction 
in work or school workload, sympathy from friends and family, and academic 
accommodations, clinicians can more adequately screen for feigned performance when 
these incentives are present. Related to the return to play incentive, it may be beneficial 
to explore what factors contribute to an athlete’s willingness to minimize symptom 
report. These factors may include the avoidance of monetary or opportunity loss, length 
of season, or perceived threat of additional or long-term injury. A more comprehensive 
understanding of the factors that contribute to feigned performance will aid in the 
development of adequate screening methods. 
As our knowledge of the relationship between incentives and neuropsychological 
test performance grows, we should also seek to broaden the use of symptom validity 
measures. Despite increasing awareness of purposeful underperformance on pre-season 
baseline testing in professional sports (Leahy, 2011), little work has explored the 
introduction of effort testing to baseline evaluations. This would allow us to quantify the 
rate of faking bad at baseline. This data could help improve our current practices for 
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screening both pre- and post-injury, and strengthen the validity of our return to play 
decisions following injury. It would be interesting to explore how knowledge of effort 
testing would influence performance. For example, if examinees are told their effort will 
be measured prior to testing, would it influence performance (i.e., reduce malingering)? 
This research may also have practical value; for example, it would be pertinent to 
evaluate whether the introduction of effort testing to pre-season baseline testing protocols 
would be an effective method of dissuading athletes from faking bad at baseline.  
General Conclusions 
 Limitations aside, the current study demonstrated that concussion is an injury that 
can be easily faked with little explicit coaching. The current results are among the first to 
suggest that the symptoms of concussion can be easily modified in either direction, such 
that individuals can both minimize and maximize their self-report of symptoms. This 
finding has implications for the way in which we conceptualize incentives and suggests 
that non-monetary incentives may represent desirable outcomes for some people. In the 
current study, participants successfully modified symptom report and demonstrated 
predictable changes in neuropsychological test performance in the face of non-monetary 
incentives. The current results also support the notion that effort contributes significantly 
to both self-report and objective measures of performance. The findings from the current 
study support several conclusions. First, it must not be assumed that individuals all 
approach an evaluation with their full effort. It must be recognized that some individuals 
will purposefully fake bad. As such, the use of symptom validity measures is appropriate 
across many evaluations, but especially those evaluations in which external incentive to 
modify performance exist. Without the use of effort measures, individuals who fake bad 
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may go undetected. Together, it seems pertinent to broaden our current conceptualization 
of the external gains that could influence performance beyond monetary reimbursement 
while also casting a wider net of symptom validity testing to accommodate this change. 
More research is required to more comprehensively explore the relationship between 
effort test failure, non-monetary incentives, and concussion, with the goal of increasing 
the validity of our decisions based upon neuropsychological test data.  
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Appendix A 
 
Integrity of Intervention Form 
 
How were you instructed to perform at the beginning of the session today? 
 
 Like an athlete who wanted to return to sports participation 
 Like a student getting ready to take the GRE 
 I was not given any instructions on how to perform 
 
Had I not been given any instructions on how to perform, my scores today were: 
 Better than how I would typically perform 
 Similar to how I would typically perform 
 Worse than how I would typically perform 
 
Do you feel you did a good job of acting as you were instructed? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If no, what happened? 
  I did not understand the instructions 
  I got confused or forgot my instructions 
  I just wanted to earn my research credit 
 Other_____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
 
Demographic Information Form 
 
Please complete the following information as yourself: 
 
1) Age:__________ 
 
2) Sex:   
 Male   
 Female 
 
3) Class Status:  
  Freshman 
  Sophomore 
    Junior 
  Senior 
  Graduate  
 
4) Student Athlete Status 
  I am currently a student athlete at Syracuse University (varsity sports) 
  I currently participate in club sports at Syracuse University  
  I am not a current member of a club or varsity sport at Syracuse University 
 
5) Concussion History 
 I have no history of concussion 
 I have sustained one (1) concussion within the past 5 years 
 I have sustained two (2) concussions in the past 5 years 
 I have sustained 3 (3) or more concussions in the past 5 years 
 
6) Disability Status 
  I am a student without a disability 
  I am a student with a physical disability 
  I am a student with a learning disability 
  I am a student with an attention disability 
  I am a student with another disability (please indicate):    
                           
 ______________________________________________ 
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Appendix C 
 
Scripts provided to participants in each experimental condition 
 
Accommodations Condition (Fake Bad) 
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion 
in a car accident.  Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you 
think and learn.  The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue, 
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking.  Other symptoms 
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud 
noises.  
 
You are also being asked to pretend that you are currently a senior in college and 
preparing to take the Graduate Record Exam (GRE).  The test is next weekend.  If you do 
well on the GRE, your chances of getting into a good graduate program are greater.  If 
you do poorly on the GRE, you will likely have to wait to apply to graduate programs 
until you are able to get more experience in your area of study.   
 
College students who have a concussion can qualify for extended time on the GRE.  To 
ensure you receive extended time on the upcoming GRE, you will need to perform on the 
following tasks in a way that suggests you are suffering from the symptoms of 
concussion. 
 
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures. 
  
Return to Play Condition (Fake Good) 
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion 
in a car accident.  Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you 
think and learn.  The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue, 
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking.  Other symptoms 
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud 
noises.  
 
You are also being asked to pretend that you are a senior in college and the starting point 
guard on the basketball team.  The big game is next weekend.  If you do well in the game, 
your chances of getting onto a good professional team are greater.  If you do poorly in the 
game, you will likely have to wait to try out for professional teams until you are able to 
get more experience at your position.   
 
College students who have a concussion can be removed from athletic competition to 
avoid further injury.  To ensure you can play in the upcoming game, you will need to 
perform on the following tasks in a way that suggests that you are not suffering from the 
symptoms of concussion.   
 
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures. 
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No Incentive Condition 
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion 
in a car accident.  Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you 
think and learn.  The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue, 
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking.  Other symptoms 
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud 
noises.  
 
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures. 
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Appendix D 
 
Researcher Script 
 
 Prior to participant’s arrival: 
i) Turn on all 10 computers, load MSVT, MCI and ImPACT 
ii) Place blank sheet of paper over each screen 
iii) At each seat, place participation packet including: 
(1) Consent to Participate 
(2) Script 
(3) SDMT 
(4) MSVT Forms 
(5) Integrity of Intervention Form 
(6) Demographic Form 
 
b) Place a pencil at each station 
 
1) As participants arrive say: “Please choose a seat.  We will begin the study shortly.” 
 
Consent 
 
 Once all participants have arrived, close the door and say: “You are here to 
participate in a study designed to evaluate the effect of concussion on test 
performance.  Let’s begin by reading through the consent form.  Please follow 
along as I read aloud.”  When finished reading ask: “Does anyone have any 
questions?”  Say: “If you agree to participate in the current study, please sign and 
print your name and include the date.”   
 
Once all participants have completed the consent, say: 
 
 “Please turn to page 3 of your participant packet.  Read the description quietly to 
yourself and follow the instructions for the remainder of the study.” 
 
“Does everyone understand what you are to do?” 
 
“Please place your participant packet to the side with the front page facing you.” 
 
ImPACT 
 
 “In a moment, I will ask you to flip over the paper on your computer screen.  
Please do not enter any information unless I tell you to do so.  Please flip over 
your paper now.  On the first screen, please enter your date of birth.  When 
you have done so, please click “Next.”” 
 
 “On the following screen, please DO NOT enter your real name.  For your 
first name, please type the letter “J” followed by your ID number located at 
  
 
79 
 
the top of your participant packet.  For your last name, please type the letter 
“D” followed by your ID number.  Please identify your gender.  Do not list 
your height, weight, or handedness.  Does anyone have any questions?” 
 
 “ will now ask you click the “Next” button until you get to the screen that says 
“Current Symptoms and Conditions – Page 1.  If you need help, please raise 
your hand.” 
 
 “Please follow the directions as listed on top of the page.  For this measure, a 
1 means low or rarely and 6 means high or always.  IT IS VERY 
IMPORTANT THAT YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU 
WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT. 
There are 6 pages of symptoms and conditions.   When you finish answers the 
symptom questions, please sit quietly. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand.  Do not begin the actual test until I tell you.  Please complete the 
symptom questions now.” 
 
 Once all participants have finished, say: “You will be asked to complete 
several short activities.  You will be provided with instructions on how to 
respond to each activity on the screen.  When I say begin, please follow the 
instructions on the screen. If you have any issues, please raise your hand.  
When you finish, please raise your hand and a research assistant will help you.   
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND 
AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
EXPERIMENT.  Do you have any questions?  Begin” 
 
 
As students finish the ImPACT, minimize the browser, and open the MSVT 
program.  
 
MSVTi 
 
  “Before we begin, the next measure, please turn to page 4 of your participant 
packet and review the information.  Remember to keep this information in 
mind as we proceed through the experiment.” 
 
 Say “Please place your participant packet to the side and flip the paper off 
your computer screen.  Before we begin this measure, please confirm the 
highlighted ID number in the section for first and last name on the screen 
matches the ID number listed on your participant packet.” 
 
 Say:  “This measure has two parts.  IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT 
YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT 
THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT.  When you finish the first 
portion, please raise your hand and a research assistant will help you.  To 
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begin, click “Testing” then “Begin MSVT”.  Select “English” and click “yes”.  
Click on the screen to begin the task.” 
 
As students finish the immediate subtests of the MSVT, minimize the screen, and 
open the Memory Complaints Inventory.  MSVTd must not be completed for 10 
minutes. 
 
MCI 
 
 “Before we begin, the next measure, please turn to page 4 of your participant 
packet and review the information.  Keep this in mind as we proceed through 
the experiment.” 
 
  Say: “Before we begin, please confirm the ID number listed in the section for 
first and last name matches the ID number listed on your participant packet.  
Do not begin the measure until I say.  IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT 
YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT 
THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT.  When you finish the 
measure, please sit quietly.  If you have any problems, please raise your hand.  
To begin this measure, please click “Testing” at the top of the screen and 
select Administer MCI.  Then select English, and click the screen to begin.  
Remember to respond to the items as you were instructed at the beginning of 
the study.  Please raise your hand if you have any issues or when you finish 
the measure.” 
 
Once all students have been administered MCI, minimize the screen and re-open 
MSVT.  Flip the paper over the screen.  Once all participants have completed the 
MCI say  
 
SDMT 
 
 “Please turn to page 5 of your participant packet. This is a different task.  
Look at the boxes.  Each box has a unique symbol and a number underneath. 
You are to fill in the numbers that correspond with each symbol.  Start at the 
top left and work across the rows.  When you come to the end of one row, 
move to the next.  Work in order and do not skip any. When I say begin, 
please complete the first 10 boxes up to the thick line to practice.”   
 
 Once everyone has finished, say: “When I say Begin, I want you to do the rest 
in the same way.  Work in order and do not skip any.  Work until I tell you to 
stop.  IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THAT YOU REMEMBER TO 
RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF 
THE EXPERIMENT Begin” 
 
 After 120s say “Stop.  Please put your participant packet to the side.” 
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MSVTd 
 
  Say “Please flip your paper over off the screen.  On the top of the screen, find 
the section marked “Testing” and click “Resume MSVT.  Follow the 
directions on the screen.  Please perform in the manner instructed at the 
beginning of the study.  When the screen asks for the password, please flip 
your paper over the screen.” 
 
i) Once all participants have completed this MSVT, say “Please turn to page 6 of 
your participant packet. I will say the first word in each pair.  Please write 
down the word that went with it. 
 
 Say “Ice. Which word went with ICE?  If you’re not sure, make your best 
guess.”  Allow time for all participants to respond. 
 
 Say “Jet.  Which word went with JET?  If you’re not sure, make your best 
guess.” 
 
 Say “Picture.  Which word went with PICTURE?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Skate.  Which word went with SKATE?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Clock.  Which word went with CLOCK?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Pizza.  Which word went with PIZZA?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Skipping.  Which word went with SKIPPING?  If you’re not sure, 
make your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Soccer.  Which word went with SOCCER?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
 Say “Gas.  Which word went with GAS?  If you’re not sure, make your 
best guess.” 
 
 Say “Wood.  Which word went with WOOD?  If you’re not sure, make 
your best guess.” 
 
ii) Say “Please turn to page 7 of your participant packet.  Now I want you to 
write down all of the words you can remember from the original list.  You can 
write them in any order, in pairs, or one at a time” 
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iii) When all participants have finished the MSVT say “Please turn to page 8 of 
your participant packet.  Please complete the next two pages independently.  
Please respond to these items as yourself, NOT as you were instructed at the 
beginning of the study.  If you are confused, please raise your hand.  When 
you finish, please turn your packet over and sit quietly.” 
 
iv) Once all participants have completed the rating forms say “You have now 
completed participation in the current study.  Thank you for your time today.  
Please sign the PSY 205 log as you leave and take a copy of the consent form.  
You will be awarded 1 hour of research participation for your help today.” 
 
Post Data Collection 
2) Once participants leave, collect participant packets, and save MSVT and MCI data at 
each station and either prepare for the next subject or log off computers. 
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Table 1 
Commonly used neuropsychological measures in concussion management 
 
Measure Ability Evaluated 
Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-
Revised² 
Visual memory 
California Verbal Learning Test² Verbal memory 
Continuous Performance Test² Sustained attention, vigilance 
Controlled Oral Word Association 
Test¹²³ 
Word fluency, word retrieval 
Cued Reaction Time²  
Delayed Recall from HVLT³ Delayed verbal memory 
Digit Span¹³ Attention Span 
Figure Detection² Constructional Skills 
Grooved Pegboard¹³ Motor speed, coordination 
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological 
Test Battery² 
Various 
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test¹²³ Verbal memory 
Memory for Designs Test² Visual Memory 
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test² Complex attention, concentration 
Reaction Times² Visuospatial attention 
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test² Verbal memory, attention, concentration 
Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure Test²  
Selective Reminding Test² Verbal memory 
Speed and Capacity of Language 
Processing Test² 
Language comprehension, visual scanning, 
psychomotor speed 
Stroop Test³ Mental flexibility, attention 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test¹²³ Visual Scanning, attention 
Trailmaking Test¹²³ Visual scanning, mental flexibility 
Verbal Fluency Test² Language 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
Revised² 
Psychomotor speed, visual memory, attention, 
concentration 
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised² Verbal memory, visual memory, story 
learning, word learning 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task² Executive functions, nonverbal problem 
solving 
  
1 Collins et al., 1999 
2 Grindel, Lovell, & Collins, 2001 
3 Maroon et al., 2000 
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Table 2 
 
Demographic characteristics of sample 
 
 
Fake 
Bad 
(n=53) 
 
Fake 
Good 
(n=62) 
 
No 
Incentive 
(n=56) 
 
Total 
Sample 
(n=171) 
 
 n % n % n % n % 
Sex         
Male 17 32.1 28 45.2 14 25.0 59 34.5 
Female 36 67.9 34 54.8 42 75.0 112 65.5 
Year in School         
Freshman 28 52.8 28 45.2 34 60.7 90 52.6 
Sophomore 6 11.3 9 14.5 7 12.5 22 12.9 
Junior 13 24.5 16 25.8 8 14.3 37 21.6 
Senior 6 11.3 9 14.5 7 12.5 22 12.9 
Athletic Status         
Varsity Athlete 7 13.2 5 8.1 6 10.7 18 10.5 
Club Athlete 8 15.1 11 17.7 7 12.5 26 15.2 
Non-Athlete 37 69.8 46 74.2 40 71.4 123 71.9 
No Response 1 1.9 0 0 3 5.4 4 2.3 
Disability Status         
Non-disabled 51 96.2 60 96.8 54 96.4 165 96.5 
Other  1 1.9 2 3.2 0 0 3 1.8 
No Response 1 1.9 0 0 2 3.6 3 1.8 
Concussion History         
No previous 40 75.5 51 82.3 51 91.1 142 83.0 
1 concussion 8 15.1 9 14.5 4 7.1 21 12.3 
2 concussions 5 9.4 2 3.2 0 0 7 4.1 
3 concussions 0 0 0 0 1 1.8 1 0.6 
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Table 3 
 
Domains of measurement, measures used, and dependent variables 
 
 
Domains and Measures 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
Memory Complaints Inventory General Memory Problems score 
Integrity of Intervention Form Consistency 
 Relative Performance  
 Simulation Success 
 
Effort Testing  
Medical Symptom Validity Test Pass/Fail 
 
Symptom Report  
Postconcussion Scale Total Symptom Score 
 Symptom Impairment 
 
Neuropsychological Test Performance  
Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and 
Cognitive Testing 
Verbal Memory 
Visual Memory 
 Visual Motor Speed 
 Reaction Time 
  
Symbol Digit Modalities Test Number of correct items 
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Table 4 
 
Kruskal-Wallis test using symptom score as the dependent variable  
           
Group   n Mean  Median Mean Rank  
Fake Bad  53 71.81  72.00  112.57 
 
Fake Good  62 25.40  14.00  48.07 
 
No Incentive  56 65.54  64.50  102.85   
χ² = 58.21, df (2), p < .001, µ² = .34** 
**Large effect size 
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Table 5 
 
Post-hoc comparison using symptom score as the dependent variable  
             
Groups   Mann-Whitney U Z  p  r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good  426.50  -6.84   <.001  .51** 
 
No Incentive – Fake Good  601.00  -6.13  <.001  .41* 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
*Medium effect 
**Large effect 
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Table 6 
 
Crosstabulation and post-hoc comparison of symptom impairment by group 
 
Symptom Report  Group                           
   Fake Bad Fake Good No Incentive χ²      p      ɸc 
   (n=53)  (n=62)  (n=56)      
Impaired  53  35  52  43.03  < .001   .50** 
 
Non-Impaired  0  27  4 
 
Symptom Report  Group                           
   Fake Bad Fake Good   χ²      p      ɸ 
   (n=53)  (n=62)        
Impaired  53  35    30.16  < .001   .51** 
 
Non-Impaired  0  27   
 
    Group                           
   No Incentive Fake Good   χ²      p      ɸ 
   (n=56)  (n=62)        
Impaired  52  35    20.13   < .001    .41* 
 
Non-Impaired  4  27   
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Medium effect 
**Large effect 
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Table 7 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests using ImPACT index scores and SDMT as dependent variables 
 
     
 Verbal Memory    
Group    n Mean Median Mean 
Rank Fake Bad  53 61.26 62.00 60.58 
Fake Good  62 84.15 88.00 115.38 
No Incentive    56 68.96 72.00 77.32 
χ² = 37.31, p < .001,µ² = .22**      
 Visual Memory    
Group    n Mean Median Mean 
Rank Fake Bad  53 53.11 52.00 65.08 
Fake Good  62 72.89 74.00 115.01 
No Incentive    56 56.91 55.50 73.69 
χ² = 34.23, p < .001,µ² = .20**      
 Visual Motor 
Speed 
   
Group    n Mean Median Mean 
Rank Fake Bad  53 27.21 27.28 61.92 
Fake Good  62 39.05 37.83 113.08 
No Incentive    56 31.28 33.88 78.81 
χ² = 32.28, p < .001,µ² = .19**      
 Reaction Time    
Group    n Mean Median Mean 
Rank Fake Bad  53 .91 .74 100.21 
Fake Good  62 .64 .63 66.95 
No Incentive    56 .83 .69 93.64 
χ² = 14.89, p = .001,µ² = .09*     
 SDMT    
Group    n Mean Median Mean 
Rank Fake Bad  53 50.36 51.00 61.83 
Fake Good  62 70.87 71.50 113.56 
No Incentive    56 56.59 57.50 78.36 
χ² = 33.20, p < .001,µ² = .20**     
*Medium effect 
**Large effect 
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Table 8 
 
Post-hoc comparison of group and ImPACT index and SDMT scores 
 
  
Verbal Memory 
 
   
Contrast Mann-Whitney U Z p r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good 634.50 -5.66 <.001 .53** 
     
No Incentive – Fake 
Good 
923.00 -4.38 <.001 .40* 
  
Visual Memory 
 
   
Contrast Mann-Whitney U Z p r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good 709.50 -5.24 <.001 .48* 
     
No Incentive – Fake 
Good 
871.00 -4.66 <.001 .43* 
  
Visual Motor Speed 
 
   
Contrast Mann-Whitney U Z p r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good 674.50 -5.43 <.001 .51** 
     
No Incentive – Fake 
Good 
1025.50 -3.83 <.001 .35* 
  
Reaction Time 
 
   
Contrast Mann-Whitney U Z p r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good 1023.50 -3.48 .001 .32* 
     
No Incentive – Fake 
Good 
1174.50 -3.03 .002 .28* 
  
SDMT 
 
   
Contrast Mann-Whitney U Z p r  
Fake Bad – Fake Good 622.00 -5.73 <.001 .52** 
No Incentive – Fake 
Good 
1048.00 -3.71 <.001 .34* 
     
*Medium effect 
**Large effect 
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Table 9 
 
Group means, and standard deviations for MSVT 
 
 Fake Bad 
(n=53) 
Fake Good  
(n=62) 
No Incentive 
(n=56) 
MSVT Immediate 
Recall 
73.96 (27.20) 98.47 (5.77) 80.63 (26.18) 
 
MSVT Delayed Recall 70.00 (27.54) 98.23 (3.15) 78.48 (27.20) 
 
MSVT Consistency 73.21 (21.17) 96.85 (6.85) 83.66 (18.89) 
 
MSVT Paired Recall 67.36 (26.97) 96.29 (10.28) 75.00 (27.44) 
 
MSVT Free Recall 47.36 (20.65) 70.10 (21.16) 52.77 (25.95) 
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Table 10 
 
Crosstabulation and post-hoc comparisons of group and effort test failure 
 
Effort Test Group                            
  Fake Bad Fake Good No Incentive χ²    p      ɸc 
  (n=53)  (n=62)  (n=56)      
Passed  19  60  31  49.14 < .001     .54** 
 
Failed  34  2  25 
 
Effort Test   Group                           
  Fake Bad Fake Good   χ²    p      ɸ 
  (n=53)  (n=62)        
Passed  19  60    49.32 < .001     .66** 
 
Failed  34  2   
 
   Group                           
  No Incentive Fake Good   χ²    p      ɸ 
  (n=56)  (n=62)        
Passed  31  60    28.60 < .001 .   49* 
 
Failed  25  2   
__________________________________________________________________ 
*Medium effect 
**Large effect 
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Table 11 
 
Comparison of current results to similar studies 
 
Current Study 
 
 Fake Bad 
(n = 53) 
 
 
 
Fake 
Good 
(n = 62) 
 
 No Incentive 
(n = 56) 
 
Measure 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Symptom Score 71.81 24.32 25.40 31.05 65.54 28.16 
 
Verbal Memory 61.26 21.17 84.15 14.33 68.96 20.07 
 
Visual Memory 53.11 19.73 72.89 13.38 56.91 17.92 
 
Visual Motor 27.21 11.36 39.05 6.88 31.28 10.95 
 
Reaction Time .91 .44 .64 .10 .83 .37 
 
SDMT Raw 50.36 21.06 70.87 14.65 56.59 19.97 
 
Similar Studies 
 
 Broglio et al., 2007 
 
Iverson et al., 2005 
 
Schatz et al., 2006 
 
 MTBI Athletes 
(n = 21) 
MTBI Athletes 
(n = 72) 
MTBI Athletes 
(n = 72) 
 
Measure M SD M SD M SD 
 
Symptom Score 25.86 20.45 17.40 16.30 26.50 22.10 
 
Verbal Memory 78.00 19.00 81.20 12.40 79.10 12.30 
 
Visual Memory 64.00 14.00 72.30 14.90 65.90 14.80 
 
Visual Motor 36.06 10.40 35.60 8.30 32.70 7.50 
 
Reaction Time .66 .18 .58 .12 .66 .15 
 
SDMT Raw   58.00 10.00   
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